

*The Department of State*

*Binding*

# bulletin

Vol. XXX, No. 774

April 26, 1954



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VOL. XXX, No. 774 • PUBLICATION 5437

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*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Public Services Division, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.*

*Publications of the Department, as well as legislative material in the field of international relations, are listed currently.*

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents  
U. S. Government Printing Office  
Washington 25, D. C.

**PRICE:**

52 issues, domestic \$7.50, foreign \$10.25  
Single copy, 20 cents

The printing of this publication has been approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 22, 1952).

**Note:** Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated.

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Annex I

April 2

## United States and United Kingdom State Positions on European Defense Community

*Following are the texts of (1) a message which the President sent on April 15 to the Prime Ministers of the six nations signatory to the European Defense Community—Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, and (2) a "Statement of Common Policy on Military Association Between the Forces of the United Kingdom and the European Defence Community,"<sup>1</sup> released on April 14 by the United Kingdom.*

### U. S. ASSURANCES CONCERNING EDC

White House press release dated April 16

As the time approaches for historic decision on the remaining measures required to put into effect the European Defense Community Treaty, it is appropriate for me to state clearly the United States position on the relation between the European Army and the European Community on the one hand, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the broader Atlantic Community on the other hand. The essential elements of this position, which have been discussed with leaders of both political parties in the Congress, may be simply stated.

The United States is firmly committed to the North Atlantic Treaty. This Treaty is in accordance with the basic security interests of the United States and will steadfastly serve those interests regardless of the fluctuations in the international situation or our relations with any country. The obligations which the United States has assumed under the Treaty will be honored.

The North Atlantic Treaty has a significance which transcends the mutual obligations assumed. It has engendered an active practical working relationship among the Atlantic nations. Through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the United States and its allies are working to build the concrete strength needed to deter aggression and, if aggression occurs, to halt it without devas-

tation or occupation of any NATO country. These nations are also seeking to make the Atlantic alliance an enduring association of free peoples, within which all members can concert their efforts toward peace, prosperity, and freedom.

The European Defense Community will form an integral part of the Atlantic Community and, within this framework, will ensure intimate and durable cooperation between the United States forces and the forces of the European Defense Community on the continent of Europe. I am convinced that the coming into force of the European Defense Community Treaty will provide a realistic basis for consolidating western defense and will lead to an ever-developing community of nations in Europe.

The United States is confident that, with these principles in mind, the Western European nations concerned will proceed promptly further to develop the European Community through ratification of the European Defense Community Treaty. When that Treaty comes into force the United States, acting in accordance with its rights and obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty, will conform its actions to the following policies and undertakings:

(1) The United States will continue to maintain in Europe, including Germany, such units of its armed forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute its fair share of the forces needed for the joint defense of the North Atlantic area while a threat to that area exists, and will continue to deploy such forces in accordance with agreed North Atlantic strategy for the defense of this area.

(2) The United States will consult with its fellow signatories to the North Atlantic Treaty and with the European Defense Community on questions of mutual concern, including the level of the respective armed forces of the European Defense Community, the United States and other North Atlantic Treaty countries to be placed at the disposal of the Supreme Commander in Europe.

(3) The United States will encourage the closest possible integration between the European Defense Community forces on the one hand, and United States and other North Atlantic Treaty

<sup>1</sup>Cmd. 9126, Memorandum regarding United Kingdom Association with the European Defence Community, Annex B.



forces on the other, in accordance with approved plans with respect to their command, training, tactical support, and logistical organization developed by the military agencies and the Supreme Commanders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

(4) The United States will continue, in conformity with my recommendations to the Congress, to seek means of extending to the Atlantic Community increased security by sharing in greater measure information with respect to the military utilization of new weapons and techniques for the improvement of the collective defense.

(5) In consonance with its policy of full and continuing support for the maintenance of the integrity and unity of the European Defence Community, the United States will regard any action from whatever quarter which threatens that integrity or unity as a threat to the security of the United States. In such event, the United States will consult in accordance with the provisions of Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

(6) In accordance with the basic interest of the United States in the North Atlantic Treaty, as expressed at the time of ratification, the Treaty was regarded as of indefinite duration rather than for any definite number of years. The United States calls attention to the fact that for it to cease to be a party to the North Atlantic Treaty would appear quite contrary to our security interests when there is established on the Continent of Europe the solid core of unity which the European Defence Community will provide.

## U.K. ASSOCIATION WITH EDC

### PART I.—COMMON AIMS

#### I

In order to bring about the effective and continuous cooperation between their respective armed forces placed under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, provided for in article 2 (a) of the agreement regarding cooperation between the United Kingdom and the European Defence Community,<sup>1</sup> the authorities concerned of the parties to that agreement have agreed that it is necessary to reconcile, on a basis of reciprocity, differing techniques in as many fields as possible, so leading to a common military outlook. They recognise that this reconciliation will be attained by progressive measures of adjustment and in the light of experience, and that the first step will be the exchange of the necessary information in the various fields. The ultimate aim is to enable the armed forces of the United Kingdom and the European Defence Community to operate together in the circumstances described in article 68 (paragraph 3), 69 (paragraph 3), and 70 (paragraph 3) of the Treaty Establishing the European Defence Community, without reducing their effectiveness.

<sup>1</sup>This draft agreement, which is included in the Command Paper, is not printed here.

## II

The following are among the particular fields, applicable to the three Services, in which a common military outlook shall be sought:—

### (a) Tactical Doctrine and Staff Methods

In order to ensure the best cooperation between units of the two armed forces, tactical doctrines and staff methods shall be reconciled as far as possible. To this end, a continuous exchange of documentary information shall take place between the military authorities of the United Kingdom and of the European Defence Community. After the establishment of the European Defence Community a joint study group shall be set up to examine the means of evolving common doctrines. Observers at tactical demonstrations and exercises shall be exchanged.

### (b) Logistics

The common aim is to remove such differences in logistics between the armed forces of the United Kingdom and of the European Defence Community placed under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, as might prejudice active operations in the field. This calls for the harmonisation of their logistic systems and the standardisation of their equipment.

### Harmonisation of Logistics Systems

(i) As a first step the elimination of differences in logistic organisation shall be sought in certain of the less controversial fields through the agency of joint study groups.

### Standardisation of Equipment

(ii) Cooperation in this field shall be closely related to the work of the military agency for standardisation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. As an immediate step, a common system of equipment referencing shall be sought. The military authorities of the United Kingdom and of the European Defence Community shall exchange all the necessary documentary information on equipment and shall arrange the appropriate demonstrations.

### (c) Training

The training methods employed by both armed forces shall be, as far as possible, on similar lines. This will be achieved from the early stages of the formation of the European Defence Forces by the exchange of personnel and of documentary information, and by the allocation of vacancies in United Kingdom military schools and training establishments to personnel of the European Defence Community, and reciprocally. At a later stage, exchanges of units may also be arranged.

These measures will in many cases represent an extension of similar facilities and arrangements at present in force between the United Kingdom and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation countries and will be subject to similar financial arrangements.

The manner in which these measures can be applied in the three Services is set out in more detail in Part II.

## III

It is recognised that the extent to which the common aims can be achieved will be conditioned by the following factors:

(a) the obligation to conform with the doctrines and policy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation;

(b) the stage of evolution of the European Defence Forces;

(c) the special characteristics of each Service: it is probable that the closest association can be achieved in the case of air forces;

(d) such security regulations as may be laid down by the parties;

(e) the resources which may be available, bearing in mind the other commitments of the United Kingdom and of the European Defence Community.

These resources are likely to vary between each Service.



**PART II.—MEASURES TO BE TAKEN BY EACH SERVICE FOR PRACTICAL COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE FORCES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE COMMUNITY**

**AIR FORCE**

i. In the early stages of the formation of the European Air Force, the Royal Air Force will assist, if desired—

- (a) in the establishment of the Headquarters of the European Air Force, including the secondment of officers;
- (b) by the secondment of officers, at all levels, to the European Air Force for command and staff service, including technical and administrative, and for flying duties;
- (c) in the formation of the European Air Defence Command and Training Command;
- (d) by providing some initial and refresher flying and technical training, and in the organisation of and supervision in technical schools.

ii. When the European Air Force is more fully established collaboration may take the following form:—

- (a) secondment of Royal Air Force staff officers for duty with the Headquarters of the European Air Force and *vice versa*;
- (b) secondment of Royal Air Force officers to the European Air Force for command and staff service, including technical and administrative, and for flying duties, and similarly of European Air Force officers to the Royal Air Force;
- (c) participation in integrated headquarters staffs in the circumstances described in Article 69 (paragraph 3) of the Treaty Establishing the European Defence Community;
- (d) Royal Air Force assistance in the organisation of European air defence including the setting up of close links between control and reporting systems of the European Defence Forces and those of the Royal Air Force;
- (e) joint study of the possibility of the correlation of the aircraft production and air training programmes of the European Defence Community and the United Kingdom.

iii. The closest association will be established between the European Air Force and Royal Air Force formations placed under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. The detailed measures of association which may be arranged will be determined by joint consultation with SACEUR. [Supreme Allied Commander, Europe] Such arrangements may include

- (a) the inclusion of individual Royal Air Force squadrons and complete Royal Air Force within European Air Force formations, and *vice versa*, where military considerations make this desirable and logistic considerations make it practicable;
- (b) training by the Royal Air Force of such squadrons as may be nominated by the European Defence Community.

**ARMY**

iv. In the early stages of the formation of the European Army, the British Army will, if desired, assist them in their planning in the following ways:

- (a) by the secondment of officers to the Headquarters of the European Army and to its training and logistics staffs;
- (b) by the extension to the European Army of the present arrangements whereby vacancies are made available at United Kingdom schools to forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. (The United Kingdom schools concerned are the Staff College, Arms Schools, the Schools of Land-Air Warfare, the Joint School of Chemical Warfare and administrative training establishments);
- (c) by the provision of suitable tactical demonstrations at the request of the European Army.

v. Once the European Army is established arrangements may be made for the exchange of personnel similar to

those already existing for the exchange of personnel between the United Kingdom forces and forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Until, however, common doctrines are developed by the United Kingdom and European Defence Forces, the level and number of such exchanges will necessarily be limited and on the following lines:—

- (a) between European Army staffs and those of the Headquarters of the British Army stationed on the Continent, including an exchange of liaison officers where appropriate;

- (b) between officers of combatant and administrative units, for limited periods;

- (c) between students at such schools and training establishments as may be agreed.

vi. The closest association will be established between the land formations of the European Defence Community and those of the United Kingdom placed under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. Detailed measures of association which may be arranged will be determined by joint consultation with SACEUR. If requested by SACEUR, such arrangements may include:

- (a) the inclusion of British Army formations within European Army formations, and *vice versa*, where military considerations make this desirable, and logistic considerations make it practicable;

- (b) large-scale joint United Kingdom and European Defence Community manoeuvres within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. In this case the directing and umpiring staffs may be integrated temporarily;

- (c) the participation of United Kingdom divisions in training and exercises with the European Army under the overall command of SACEUR, and *vice versa*. In similar conditions, small units of the British Army may take part in formation training with the European Army and *vice versa*.

**NAVY**

vii. Close association already exists between navies of the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Royal Navy, and will be extended to the European Defence Community. Assistance during the build-up period may be of particular value.

viii. The Royal Navy will cooperate in the following ways:—

- (a) by the provision of limited training facilities;

- (b) by the participation of Royal Navy units in training and at naval or amphibious exercises which include European Naval Forces;

- (c) by close cooperation with the European Defence Community in the organisation, working and function of the European Admiralty, including the appointment of a liaison officer;

- (d) by advising on the development of the European Navy.

PARIS, April 13, 1954.

**Luxembourg Parliament Acts on EDC Treaty**

*Statement by the President*

White House press release dated April 7

I have just learned of the vote of the Luxembourg Parliament, approving ratification of the treaty establishing the European Defence Community. Luxembourg has thus become the fourth of the six European Defence Community nations whose Parliament has taken favorable action.

This represents further significant progress in the establishment of this Community. The integration of the defense forces of France, Germany, the Benelux nations and Italy will do much to assure conditions in Europe which will contribute to the peace and security of that area.

## **Loan Negotiations With Coal and Steel Community**

Press release 184 dated April 8

Negotiations opened on April 8 between the U.S. Government and the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community to implement the suggestion put forward by President Eisenhower in June 1953 that financing of a portion of the High Authority's investment program by the U.S. Government or one of its agencies would foster European integration in a tangible and useful way.

The United States delegation consists of Secretary Dulles, Secretary of the Treasury George M. Humphrey, Deputy Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, William M. Rand, and the Managing Director and President of the Export-Import Bank, Gen. Glen E. Edgerton.

The High Authority is represented by its President, Jean Monnet, and two of its members, Enzo Giacchero and Heinz Potthoff.

In the first meeting the representatives of the High Authority submitted a request for a loan from the United States to be used in the financing of the development of the raw material resources of the Community. Subsequent meetings are to take place on a daily schedule.

## **U.S.-U.K.-French Discussions on Indochina and Southeast Asia**

### **U.S.-U.K. Statement**

Press release 192 dated April 13

*Following is the text of a joint statement by Secretary Dulles and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden:*

At the conclusion of their meetings in London on April 12 and 13, during which they discussed a number of matters of common concern, Mr. John Foster Dulles and Mr. Anthony Eden issued the following statement:

We have had a full exchange of views with reference to Southeast Asia. We deplore the fact

that on the eve of the Geneva Conference the Communist forces in Indochina are increasingly developing their activities into a large-scale war against the forces of the French Union. They seek to overthrow the lawful and friendly Government of Viet-Nam which we recognize; and they have invaded Laos and Cambodia. We realize that these activities not only threaten those now directly involved, but also endanger the peace and security of the entire area of Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific, where our two nations and other friendly and allied nations have vital interests.

Accordingly we are ready to take part, with the other countries principally concerned, in an examination of the possibility of establishing a collective defense, within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, to assure the peace, security and freedom of Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific.

It is our hope that the Geneva Conference will lead to the restoration of peace in Indochina. We believe that the prospect of establishing a unity of defensive purpose throughout Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific will contribute to an honorable peace in Indochina.

We have also discussed developments in the field of atomic energy. It will be recalled that on March 19 the Soviet Ambassador in Washington was handed by the Secretary of State of the United States a concrete proposal elaborating on that portion of President Eisenhower's speech of December 8, 1953, before the General Assembly of the United Nations which dealt with the subject of peaceful use of atomic energy. The Government of the United Kingdom, together with several other friendly nations concerned, had been consulted and had concurred in the terms of the concrete proposal before it was given to the Soviet Government. No reply has yet been received from that government, which is studying the proposal. We also noted that the British Representative to the United Nations in New York, with the support of the United States and French Representatives, had suggested that a call be issued for an early meeting of the subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations.

### **U. S.-French Statement**

Press release 197 dated April 14

Following their conversations in Paris on April 14th, the United States Secretary of State, Mr. John Foster Dulles, and the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Bidault, issued the following statement:

For nearly two centuries it has been the practice for representatives of our two nations to meet together to discuss the grave issues which from time to time have confronted us.



In pursuance of this custom, which we hope to continue to the benefit of ourselves and others, we have had an exchange of views on Indochina and Southeast Asia.

Mr. Dulles expressed admiration for the gallant fight of the French Union forces, who continue with unshakeable courage and determination to repel Communist aggression.

We deplore the fact that on the eve of the Geneva Conference this aggression has reached a new climax in Viet-Nam particularly at Dien-Bien-Phu and has been renewed in Laos and extended to Cambodia.

The independence of the three Associated States within the French Union, which new agreements are to complete, is at stake in these battles.

We recognize that the prolongation of the war in Indochina, which endangers the security of the countries immediately affected, also threatens the entire area of Southeast Asia and of the Western Pacific. In close association with other interested nations, we will examine the possibility of establishing, within the framework of the United Nations Charter, a collective defense to assure the peace, security and freedom of this area.

We recognize that our basic objective at the Geneva Conference will be to seek the re-establishment of a peace in Indochina which will safeguard the freedom of its people and the independence of the Associated States. We are convinced that the possibility of obtaining this objective depends upon our solidarity.

#### **Statement by Secretary Dulles<sup>1</sup>**

I went to London and Paris because of the critical situation in Indochina and the threat that it carried to the vital interests of many countries in Southeast Asia and the Pacific.

Among those vital interests are those of the French Union and the British Commonwealth. I returned well satisfied with the results of my trip.

The loss of the China mainland to communism was a great disaster. That disaster would be compounded if there were added to it the loss of the millions of people, the vast economic resources, and the strategic position represented by Southeast Asia and the Pacific islands.

I feel confident that that loss can be prevented without extending the Indochina war if the free nations having vital interests in the area are united in a determination to preserve peace and freedom in the area. That unity of purpose rests upon full understanding. That understanding has been greatly enhanced by the talks which I have had in London with Prime Minister Churchill and Foreign Secretary Eden, and the talks I have had in Paris with Premier Laniel and Foreign Minister

Bidault. Our common purposes were expressed in joint statements which we issued on Tuesday in London and yesterday in Paris.

Already before I left for London the Government of Thailand had indicated its approval of our purposes, and President Magsaysay of the Philippines has now indicated acceptance in principle.

Out of this unity, which is now taking definite form, will come free-world strength which, I believe, will lead the Communists to renounce their extravagant ambitions to dominate yet another major portion of the globe.

The Geneva conference, which begins a week from Monday, will be a test. I am more than ever persuaded that if the free world stands firm, the Geneva conference will advance the cause of freedom in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, and safeguard that freedom in peace and justice.

#### **U.S. Policy Toward Indochina**

*Statement by Jameson Parker  
Department Press Officer<sup>1</sup>*

Certain remarks with regard to United States policy toward Indochina have been attributed to a high Government official (Vice President Nixon). The contents of the speech referred to and questions and answers which followed were off the record, but a complete report of the speech has been made available to the State Department.

The speech enunciated no new United States policy with regard to Indochina. It expressed full agreement with and support for the policy with respect to Indochina previously enunciated by the President and the Secretary of State.

That policy was authoritatively set forth by the Secretary of State in his speech of March 29, 1954,<sup>2</sup> in which he said:

Under the conditions of today, the imposition on Southeast Asia of the political system of Communist Russia and its Chinese Communist ally, by whatever means, would be a grave threat to the whole free community. The United States feels that that possibility should not be passively accepted but should be met by united action. This might involve serious risks. But these risks are far less than those that will face us a few years from now if we dare not be resolute today.

In regard to a hypothetical question as to whether United States forces should be sent to Indochina in the event of French withdrawal, the high Government official categorically rejected the

<sup>1</sup> Made at Syracuse, N. Y., on Apr. 15 upon his return from London and Paris.

<sup>1</sup> Made to correspondents on Apr. 17.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Apr. 12, 1954, p. 539.



premise of possible French withdrawal. Insofar as the use of United States forces in Indochina was concerned, he was stating a course of possible action which he was personally prepared to support under a highly unlikely hypothesis.

The answer to the question correctly emphasized the fact that the interests of the United States and other free nations are vitally involved with the interests of France and the Associated States in resisting Communist domination of Indochina.

## Present United States Policy Toward China

*by Alfred le Sesne Jenkins*

*Officer in Charge, Chinese Political Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

In recent years we have often heard it said that more heat than light has been cast on the China question. I am not surprised at the heat, nor do I object to it, provided there is also sufficient light. The fate of one-fourth of the world's population is not a matter which can be taken lightly, and the addition of China's vast material and manpower resources to the Soviet bloc is a matter involving not only the security interests of the United States but those of the entire free world. I do not see how one can help feeling strongly about these matters. We need not apologize that our thinking about China is charged with feeling. National policies are an expression of national interests concerning which there is naturally much feeling, and our policies are an expression both of what we are and of what we want. We are a nation of free peoples. We want to remain free to pursue in peace our proper national destiny, and we want the same freedom and rights for others.

We do not believe that the Chinese Communist regime represents the will of the people it controls. First capitalizing on the natural desire of the Chinese people to enjoy full recognition and respect for their importance in the world community, the regime then proceeded by its "lean-to-one-side" policy to betray the powerful Chinese longings to stand up straight. It has followed slavishly the leadership of the Soviet Union and attempted to emulate it in all its ways. With the aid of thousands of Soviet advisers it

## Letters of Credence

### *Yugoslavia*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, Leo Mates, presented his credentials to the President on April 13. For the text of the Ambassador's remarks and the text of the President's reply, see Department of State press release 193.

has set about methodically to change the entire fabric of traditional Chinese culture, substituting communism's materialistic, atheistic doctrines wherein the state is the be-all and end-all and the individual its pawn.

The regime at first attracted considerable support, principally through its sponsorship of a land redistribution program, but is now, after establishment of the prerequisite police-state controls, taking the land away from the owners in the same collectivization process which is familiar in other Communist countries and which invariably has brought suffering in its wake. China's much advertised "New Democracy" is of course in reality "old communism."

From its inception the regime has proclaimed a "lean-to-one-side" policy in foreign affairs, and has left no doubt about its dedication to the proposition of world Communist revolution under the leadership of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. While its "leaning-to-one-side" has not brought it to the position of complete "prostration-to-one-side" characteristic of the Eastern European Soviet satellites, there is not the slightest evidence that this indicates any separatist tendencies. The difference in status of Peiping in its relationship with Moscow (as distinguished from that of the Eastern European satellites) is rather due chiefly to its having come to power without benefit, except in Manchuria, of Soviet Army occupation; to the prestige of Mao Tse-tung, arising from his long history of leadership of Chinese communism and his literary contributions to theoretical communism; to China's assumption of the role of leadership in the Com-

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia, Pa., on Apr. 2.

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munist program for Asia; and to the geographical position, size, and importance of China itself. This relationship has been characterized as that of junior partner, and the association has every mark of being a willing, determined, and close one.

#### Cooperation Between Mao and Moscow

Although Soviet officials previous to the Chinese Communist assumption of power were protesting that they did not know what "those independent agrarian reformers" were up to, there was already close cooperation between Mao and Moscow. Despite the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed on August 14, 1945, which specified that Soviet "support and aid . . . be entirely given to the national government as the central government of China," the Soviet Union a few months later turned over to the Chinese Communists the Japanese equipment it received in Manchuria. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics instituted diplomatic relations with Peiping only 2 days after the regime's establishment, and five Eastern European Soviet satellites followed suit within the week. The North Korean regime, the East German Communist satellite, and the so-called People's Republic of Mongolia also established diplomatic relations with the new regime during the first month of its existence.

The Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, a mass organization whose aim, according to the Communists, is "to found and consolidate fraternal friendship and cooperation between the Chinese and Soviet people and to develop the interflow of knowledge and experience of the two great nations" was founded in Peiping only 4 days after the establishment of the so-called "People's Government."

The Mao regime has since concluded with the Soviet Union and other Communist states various economic, military, and cultural treaties and agreements. Strong ideological ties bind Moscow and Peiping, and a number of Chinese Communist leaders are Moscow trained. The Chinese Communists also feel the need for close association with the Soviet Union to develop their military strength and striking power. They need Russian military supplies and equipment, and Russian technicians and economic aid for the development of heavy industry, which they view as a necessary base for a large military establishment. In exchange, China can furnish the Soviet Union with needed raw materials and food stuffs, and offer the use of the warm water ports of Dairen and Port Arthur. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics does not want a strong, independent China on its Siberian border. It is naturally interested in the survival and growth of a Communist China (so long as it does not grow

too strong and independent) and in alliance with a Communist China it is in a far stronger power position than it would be otherwise. The close cooperation and interdependence between the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union in the Korean aggression is well known.

As a corollary to Communist China's "leaning" to the Soviet side, she has unceasingly heaped vituperation and all manner of abuse and insult upon the free world in general and the United States in particular—over the radio, in newspapers, at the conference table, and in numerous periodicals in many languages (even including Esperanto), which are sent all over the world.

Aside from the serious policy implications in this performance, such conduct somehow seems especially shocking, coming from the Chinese. For well over a century Americans have had a deep interest in and sincere friendship for the Chinese people. Our record in supporting China's territorial integrity and political independence is a well-known one. It is a source of deep concern and regret to us that for more than 4 years we have been cut off from our accustomed close association with the great majority of the Chinese people.

There are some who feel that this unfortunate situation could be remedied if we were to recognize the Peiping regime and if it were accepted as representing China in the United Nations. Actually, even if we considered such action to be morally justifiable, there is not a shred of evidence to indicate that we could expect reciprocity on any satisfactory basis, leading to a renewal of our association with the Chinese on the mainland. During the few months preceding and following the establishment of the so-called People's Government in Peiping, Chinese Communist authorities jailed or otherwise maltreated a number of our official representatives, and never recognized their official status. Finally, when the situation became intolerable, we withdrew all of our official representatives, requesting the British to represent our interests. The British have tried to do this to the best of their ability. They are hampered in this endeavor, however, for while they have recognized the regime and have diplomatic and consular officials on the mainland, the Communists have not seen fit to establish diplomatic relations with the British, and have refused to accord full accreditation to British officials. The British, and indeed others with fully accredited representation in Peiping, have in vain attempted on our behalf to secure the release of some hundred Americans held in Communist China against their wishes, 32 of whom are in jail now, held incommunicado, without trial, and without even a statement of the charges held against them.

#### Conduct of Peiping Regime

The Peiping regime has followed no recognized standards of international conduct. It has re-



peatedly violated the terms of the Korean Armistice Agreement. It has disregarded international rules on the care of prisoners of war. In order to secure sorely needed foreign exchange to carry on its aggressive adventures and its subversive activities in other countries, it has engaged in narcotics trade throughout the world and has directed an extortion racket against overseas Chinese whose relatives on the mainland are at its mercy. In addition to its aggression in Korea and its defiance of the United Nations itself, it has supplied the Communist Viet Minh armies with equipment and advisers and trained Viet Minh troops on Chinese soil. It has swept aside traditional local autonomy in Tibet and has carried on an active program of intimidation and subversion throughout Southeast Asia.

Internally, the Mao regime is a ruthless police state with all that that implies. Millions of Chinese have been murdered or have committed suicide in connection with the phoney land reforms and the campaigns against alleged irregularities of private businessmen. Property of both Chinese and foreigners has been confiscated without compensation. Personal liberty is a thing of the past. The "justice" of the so-called people's courts is subservient to state policies. Movements of individuals are closely controlled. There is forced labor on a large scale. Children are trained and forced to inform on their parents and friends. There is not even freedom of silence, since all must be vocal in support of Communist policies. Mass "brainwashing" is a continuous process through daily study groups and all media of communication. The family unit has become a special target of the Communist system. The Communists have rewritten history and attempted to make religion the handmaiden of politics.

In view of all these considerations it is hardly surprising that the firm policy of the United States Government is one of strong opposition to the Chinese Communist regime. We cannot recognize this regime, and we shall continue vigorously to oppose attempts to accept it in any United Nations organization as representing the Chinese people. We earnestly solicit the support of the entire free world in these policies. We would view with deep concern a "creeping acceptance" of the Peiping regime by the world community of nations.

We further consider that recognition and acceptance of the Peiping regime would have the effect of substantially weakening the will to resist Communist expansion on the part of other Asian people. The nations and people near the Chinese mainland might under such circumstances erroneously tend to view communism as "the inevitable wave of the future" and more and more incline their political leanings and economic activities to accommodate this conviction. If the Chinese Communist regime were the only China to which the 12 million overseas Chinese could

look, the Communists would have an important, readymade "fifth column" throughout Southeast Asia and in many other nations of the world. They already have the support of some of these Chinese, but their following among them has fallen off markedly since the extortion episode and as the nature of the regime's excesses has become increasingly apparent.

Those who favor recognition of the Peiping regime beg the question by urging us to "recognize reality." We do recognize reality, and much of it we do not like. But it is not in the American tradition to confuse the real with the immutable. We recognize with concern an increase in the incidence of cancer in recent years, but we refuse to recognize cancer as "the inevitable wave of the future."

So much for our political policy toward the Chinese Communist regime. On the military side it is the view of the United States that the way to deter aggression is for the free community to be willing and able to respond vigorously at places and with means of its own choosing.

#### Policy of Total Embargo

On the economic side we follow a policy of total embargo against Communist China, and our ships are forbidden to call at Communist Chinese ports. It is realized that every kind of merchandise cannot be considered to be directly helpful on the battlefield. We have felt, however, that the maximum possible economic pressures should be applied against an aggressor engaged in fighting and killing the troops of the United States and other free countries. The aggression in Korea, so far as Communist China is concerned, will not be considered over until its troops are all withdrawn. The Armistice in Korea only stopped the shooting—doubtless because the Communists found the fighting unprofitable—but we have seen no indication so far that the Mao regime has abandoned its aggressive policies. If the time should come when the consideration of lessening economic controls appears appropriate, we shall still bear in mind the effect of such action in regard to Communist China's plans to build a large war potential and its avowed intent to "liberate" all of Asia and eventually the world.

We have been committed since signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement last July and the passage of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution last August to seek a Korean Political Conference. We have patiently sought since early September to arrange for such a conference on terms consonant with the Armistice Agreement and the United Nations Resolution. The Berlin conference laid plans for a multipower conference at Geneva on April 26 to consider a Korean settlement. This will not be, as the Communists are claiming, a five-power conference. Communist China, far from attending the conference as a

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great power, will not in our view even attend as a government. At Berlin we secured Soviet agreement to the following statement:

It is understood that neither the invitation to, nor the holding of, the above-mentioned conference shall be deemed to imply diplomatic recognition in any case where it has not already been accorded.

The time, place, and composition of the Korean Political Conference are entirely as we wanted. We do not fear this conference. As Secretary Dulles has said,

There is . . . no reason why we should refuse to seek peacefully the results we want merely because of fear that we will be outmaneuvered at the conference table. . . . Our cause is not so poor, and our capacity not so low, that our Nation must seek security by sulking in its tent.

We will not be prepared at Geneva to allow the aggressors to achieve at the conference table what they failed to achieve in battle. This applies not only to territorial considerations but to any "deal" which would, as has been suggested in some quarters, trade a United Nations seat and an end to the trade controls for an agreement by Communist China to stop supplying the Viet Minh. As a recent New York *Times* editorial put it,

There is neither logic nor profit in paying a bribe to the Communists to get their worthless promise not to do again what they had no business doing in the first place.

#### U.S. Approach to Geneva Conference

Whatever the Communist attitude, we will go to Geneva in good faith and do our best to achieve just solutions to the Korean and Indochinese problems. There is the bare possibility that Soviet Russia and its Chinese Communist ally may be sufficiently preoccupied with plans for internal development to cause them at least to desire a period of relaxation in both areas on an acceptable basis. Meanwhile, we are keenly sensible to the Communist habit of waging war by cease-fire and do not discount the possibility that they might use a cessation of hostilities merely as an opportunity to build up for renewed attacks. In our view, any settlement in Korea or Indochina would have to provide effective guarantees against such a possibility.

Certainly we do not contemplate any action at Geneva or anywhere else which would damage the cause of the Government of the Republic of China. Our policy is to extend moral and material support to the Free Chinese, and we have no intention of letting them down. Their Government has been constant in its opposition to lawless imperialism. We do not forget that the Government of China under President Chiang Kai-shek, during the long years of its lone stand against the Japanese invader, had several opportunities to reach a seemingly advantageous accommodation with the invading power, but refused to do so. The Chinese Government early recognized the true

complexion of the Chinese Communists and refused to compromise with them. Just as we view the unswerving friendship of the Chinese Government with gratitude, we also view its growth in material strength and political appeal with satisfaction. We are prepared to lend our continued support to these ends, but we cannot ourselves fashion them. This, of course, is primarily a Chinese responsibility. The military and economic progress which has taken place on Formosa during the past 4 years has been heartening. We hope and are confident that the progress which the Free Chinese are making will stand in increasingly favorable contrast to the regimentation and oppression of the mainland regime.

We will continue military and economic aid to the Government of Free China. We will continue to recognize it as the Government of China, and we will support it as the representative of China in the United Nations. We are convinced that even though it is cut off from the mainland, it is far more representative of the will of the Chinese people than is the Peiping regime. It has conducted itself in the United Nations ably, responsibly, and with dignity. The free world can deal with this Government on mutually understandable terms. It does not employ the upside-down vocabulary of the Communists.

International politics, like domestic politics, is in the last analysis an art of the possible. I do not mean by this that a solution to "the China problem" is impossible. I mean that the solution is not likely to be easy or quick. Time, however, *can* be on our side. The greatest thing the Communists have to fear is truth. This fear erected both the Iron Curtain and the Bamboo Curtain. There is nothing new about communism, and we know that it is by no means "the inevitable wave of the future." It has been tried for a long time and has proven itself totally incapable of making good on its promises. We are resolved to remain strong in order to have the time to demonstrate, beyond the power of curtains to hide, the simple truth that the systems fashioned by free men can tap the energies and meet the needs of their peoples incomparably better than can a materialistic and cynical system of coercion and regimentation. This truth must yet make millions free who are now enslaved, including the Chinese on the mainland.

The course which we are now pursuing with respect to China may not be easy or quick, but we must never for one moment doubt the possibility of reaching our objectives with honor and with a full sense of our responsibility to this and to future generations. In this let us not seek the counsel either of the timid or of the foolhardy. We feel strongly about the China problem because it affects not only our security but the very values by which we live. If we stand honestly on those principles which have brought us thus far, we need not fear that we shall have to stand alone.

## The Middle East in New Perspective

by Henry A. Byroade

Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs<sup>1</sup>

To me the Middle East is one of the most fascinating parts of the world, and I am convinced all Americans would find it so. It has been my good fortune to visit each of its states at least twice, and at each stop one wishes he could stay long enough to find out more—about not only the present-day political and economic problems but the culture and traditions, the hopes and aspirations of the people themselves.

The area for which I am responsible abounds in superlative contrasts. It flaunts diversity of costumes unrivaled anywhere else in the world from the Evzones of Greece, the veiled Tuaregs of North Africa, the jaunty agal and kaffiyeh of the desert Arab, and the multicolored jackets of the Kurd to the Dinka, the Nuwwar and the Shilluk of the Sudan who wears nothing at all. The world's richest men and the world's poorest have lived side by side in this area for ages. The piercing minaret of the mosque, the church belfry, the dome of the synagogue attest to the evolution of the world's loftiest religious faiths. And where the peasant still plants his seed with the simplest of wooden tools, airplanes spread insecticides to halt the march of the devouring locust. Nowhere else in our universe do such extremes stand in intimate juxtaposition.

One's study of history—or one's visit to the area—need not be exhaustive or lengthy for the conclusion that these people, beset as they are by present day embroilments or economic poverty, have had a rich life—rich in the things one may say make life worthwhile.

In fact the strength of our Western civilization rests to a considerable extent on the foundations of the ideas and sciences developed in the Middle East. How could we have modern banks or accounting had it not been for the Arabic numerals which made rapid calculation possible? Ibn i Haitham a thousand years ago discovered the science of optics leading to the use of the microscope. In Iran, the millennial celebration of Avicenna is taking place—the man who wrote one

of the greatest collections of medical lore known before the eighteenth century. Similarly our moral values, our ideas, and our symbols of cultural intercourse to a great extent originated in the Middle East. If by some ill wind we were suddenly to be deprived of the heritage given us by the Middle East, we would be deprived of much of the basis of the advanced state of our present day civilization.

Yet this area—with its past elements of greatness and its promise for the future—is today involved in difficulties to such an extent that it can truly be called a "trouble area" of the world. And we as a country are more involved in the problems of the area than ever before. Why is this so? The answer is simple. We can no longer avoid these problems even if we would choose to do so—and we cannot choose to do so—in the interests of our own welfare and security.

The United States has been thrust into the Middle Eastern scene suddenly and without adequate national preparation. During most of our national growth the peoples and problems of the Middle East have seemed remote from our daily lives. Because of our expanding continental boundaries, our eyes were naturally turned toward our own West until 1900. Our concern was with national developments and with Latin America. The United States later involved in two world conflicts, then focused most of its attention on Europe and the Far East. For long the Middle East knew only American missionaries, archeologists, doctors, and educators.

In this period the United States had a humanitarian interest in developments in the Middle East; it had a few trade interests, but other than that our positive interests were few. Then, as now, we had no interests of a colonial nature, no alliances that gave us direct political responsibilities.

Our position in the Middle East has changed simply because our world position has changed and because the world in which we live has changed, changed to where there is in the East-West situation for the first time an ever present

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the Dayton World Affairs Council, Dayton, Ohio, on Apr. 9 (press release 185).



and continuous threat to the security of our own country. The day when we could look at a few large countries and say "these—and what happens there—are important to us" is unfortunately gone. Today one can scarcely think of an area and say it is safe and secure and we need not concern ourselves. Least of all can we say that about the Middle East.

#### Importance of Area to U.S.

I say least of all the Middle East for many reasons. First of all—and this must always come first—are the people of the Middle East itself, some 65 million souls, whose welfare concerns us and whose views and policies are influential throughout the whole Asian-African belt of restive people. Secondly there is the strategic position of the Middle East from a geographic viewpoint. History is amply tabled with the names of conquerors and would-be conquerors who have used this crossroads of three continents in their search for empires. Every major international airline connecting Asia with Europe and the United States passes through the Middle East. The Suez Canal is a vital artery of world shipping, offering an easy route to South Asia, with its tremendous sources of manpower and raw materials, and to the continent of Africa, with its deposits of uranium, manganese, chrome and copper. General Eisenhower has said, "As far as sheer value of territory is concerned, there is no more strategically important area in the world." And thirdly, one must think of the resources of the area. Without the oil of the Middle East the industries of our allies would be paralyzed and our own would be overworked. It is of vast importance that such resources not come into the hands of enemies of the non-Communist world.

Out of these three points come the objectives of American policy in the Middle East. In themselves these appear as simple matters: (1) the promotion of peace in the area among the Middle Eastern states themselves as well as better understanding between them and the Western Powers; (2) a desire to see governmental stability and the maintenance of law and order; (3) the creation of conditions which would bring about a rise in the general economic welfare; (4) the preservation and strengthening of democracy's growth—not necessarily in our own pattern, but at least in a form which recognizes the same basic principles as the democracy in which we believe; and (5) the encouragement of regional defense measures against aggression from outside the area.

Yet the troubles and undercurrents which exist today in the Middle East make it exceedingly difficult for us to reach our objectives. Many of the nations in this area are newly independent and therefore extremely jealous of their national sovereignty. After years of occupation, or foreign entanglements of various sorts, they are suspicious

of all foreign influence. In some cases, the doctrine of nationalism has assumed extreme forms.

Some of these states are fearful. In certain areas the fear of one's neighbor exceeds that from any other direction. It is a surprise to many Americans that Soviet encroachment and imperialism is not recognized in parts of the Middle East as the primary danger. Some of the Middle East see an enemy much closer at hand. They turn their thoughts and actions not toward the security of the whole region but to security of one against the other, and they thus present a picture of disunity of purpose which can be and is being exploited by the agents of the Soviet Union.

And then there is fear even of one's own kind. Many Middle Easterners look upon their governments as cold and selfish bodies little interested in the welfare of the people under it. Therefore, whom to trust? Whom to believe in? Whom to work for? The result has been a pattern of political instability.

Finally, the difficulties are made even greater by the economic poverty and inequalities in the region. Those countries which have no mineral wealth such as oil face tremendous problems in any effort to improve their well-being. Without aid of other countries it is impossible for some of them to even start the necessary development of their country.

In an effort to assist constructively in the solution of the basic causes of instability in the area one finds that the political base upon which to work does not today exist. The all-absorbing attention of governments and people is at present focused to too great an extent upon disputes which lie within the area or between states of the area and outside powers. The list of these disputes is appalling. The Anglo-Egyptian dispute over the Suez Canal base and in the Sudan, the great complex of Arab-Israeli problems, the dispute over boundaries in the Trucial coast area between Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom, the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute. To this could be added many lesser grievances. One must, to complete the picture, add on one side the situation in North Africa between the French and the local populations in Morocco and Tunisia, and on the other the difficulties between India and Pakistan, symbolized by the Kashmir question, because these, while outside the Middle East itself, have a bearing upon the stability of the area as a whole.

In each of these problems the United States is involved—involved either because our influence is sought or because we must take a position in the United Nations or between two friends, or because we feel a mutually satisfactory solution is so important to the security of the area and hence to ourselves that we must take an active interest.

#### The Arab-Israeli Situation

I shall only attempt to cover, and that briefly, one of these specific situations tonight. I have



chosen for this purpose the most fundamental of all these disputes, the one most detrimental to the renaissance that seems overdue in the area and the one which seems least capable of early and satisfactory solution. I refer to the Arab-Israeli situation.

You are, of course, aware of the general factors underlying the establishment of Israel. In lending their support, the American people acted in large measure out of sympathy and horror at the outrages committed against the Jewish people in Europe during the past 25 years.

The people of the Arab States have cried out against this action of the United States. The birth of the tragic Arab refugee problem out of the Palestine conflict has added to the real and deep-seated bitterness which replaced, to some extent at least, an earlier faith in the United States. The emotions which surround this problem in the Middle East are so tense that any immediate or dramatic solution of the problem is impossible. Even progress toward solution of any segment of the problem is at best exceedingly difficult. Yet I am convinced that the United States must, in its own interests, devote a major effort toward easing the tensions that have sprung from this situation. There is today a blockade, one might say almost an iron curtain, between the Arab States and Israel. In these circumstances new generations of youth are being brought up in isolation and cannot judge for themselves the truth of the propaganda falling on their ears. It is a situation which, if not corrected, has in it the seeds of still more disastrous conflict in the Middle East.

What are the cases of the two sides of this dispute? Here are the views of David, who migrated to Israel and is now an Israeli citizen, and the views of Ahmed, a citizen of an Arab State near the Israel borders.

#### THE ISRAELI CASE

David sees in Israel's creation the fulfillment of the prophecy of Ezekiel (XXXVII, 21), "Behold, I will take the children of Israel from among the heathen, whither they be gone, and will gather them on every side, and bring them into their own land." This lends a mystical force to the work of David and other founders of Israel.

David declares that the present borders of Israel, including the additional territory beyond the line recommended by the United Nations partition resolution of 1947, are the result of the conflict provoked by the Arabs' unsuccessful assault on the new state. Any significant change to the detriment of Israel in these frontiers, which were won by Israeli blood, would therefore be to him unthinkable and unjust.

It follows in his thinking that the refugee problem was not created by Israel. He maintains the Arabs of Palestine were induced to flee in large numbers as part of a deliberate policy of their

leaders, which backfired. He believes they were told that their exodus would assist in crippling Israel and that after a few weeks of fighting they would return on the heels of the victorious Arab armies. He repeats often the charge that, instead of caring for their own, the Arab States actually obstruct refugee resettlement, forcing these unfortunate people to rot in camps and endeavoring to use their plight as a vehicle through which to appeal to world sympathies. By contrast, he says Israel has opened her doors to over 700,000 immigrants. In his eyes, Israel deserves world support since it has lifted from the world's conscience the burden of determining what should be done with Jewish victims of anti-Semitic persecution, as through heavy sacrifice the people of Israel, assisted by world Jewry, are integrating these refugees into Israel, creating for them new homes and means of livelihood. He feels an obligation to provide a haven for still further Jewish immigrants, either to rescue them from persecution or even perhaps to strengthen Israel by increasing her population.

David maintains that the possibility of the return of Arab refugees to Israel in appreciable numbers no longer exists. Their land has been taken up. However, he points out that ample land and water both exist in the Arab States which could be made available to these Palestinians. In addition, he states their return would present an unacceptable security problem, particularly in the face of the continued hostility of Israel's neighbors. He says Israel is, however, willing to assist in their reintegration elsewhere. Certain blocked funds have already been released to the Arab refugees, and he says Israel is prepared, by paying compensation, to contribute economically to their integration in the Arab countries.

He says water means life for Israel's economy; prospects for self-sufficiency depend upon full development of available water resources. David maintains that obstructionist Arab policies and a dog-in-manger attitude therefore cannot be permitted to stop irrigation plans. In his eyes the Arab States possess ample water resources of their own; why then should they lay claim to the meager streams to which Israel has access?

To David, the soul of Israel is in Jerusalem, a city to which generations of Jews have longed to return. To surrender control of new Jerusalem to any other entity he would see as out of the question. He notes that the Christian and Moslem holy places, in which the world religious community has a legitimate interest, are largely concentrated in the areas now held by Jordan. He says Israel is willing to give the firmest guarantees with respect to holy places within the territory under its control and is willing to provide free access to them but is unwilling to trust the lives of Jewish citizens to some nonexistent international force.

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says Israel has and must in the future depend primarily upon its army and its own people. In the crucial days of 1948, he points out, the United Nations was unable to prevent six Arab armies from invading Israel—and that Israel's arms, courage, and resourcefulness alone turned back the invaders. At the moment, he sees Israel's frontiers subjected to increasing pressures which the United Nations and the world powers have proved impotent to stop.

This, then, is David's case. He has repeatedly urged the Arab States to sit down with Israel at a conference table to conclude peace on the above basis. The Arabs have persistently refused. They take an almost diametrically opposed stand on the same issues.

#### THE ARAB CASE

The Arab case must be considered in the context of the present emotional ferment in the Arab world. Ahmed, the Arab, regards the creation of Israel as another example of imperialist exploitation. Thus, his reaction against Israel dovetails with the growing nationalism of his people and feeds their resentment and distrust of the West. Ahmed's instinctive reaction to the alien element of Israel is to build up a wall against it, to isolate it, and eventually to absorb or overwhelm it. Unaffected by the value we place on time, Ahmed is content to wait, confident that Israel will eventually meet the fate which befell the Crusades.

Ahmed concentrates his bitterness on political Zionism which he regards as ruthless, materialistic, and exemplifying those traits of Western culture most antipathetical to him. He declares that Moslems, Christians, and Jews lived in harmony until this political factor was injected by the Balfour Declaration of 1917. Ahmed fears that further immigration of Jewish people to Israel will inevitably result in territorial expansion by Israel, and his fears are based on statements by Zionist leaders who look to further immigration.

To Ahmed the creation of Israel may not be justified on any ethical or legal grounds. For many centuries the land belonged to his people. A tiny Jewish minority was well treated. Ahmed sees no ethnic basis for the claim that the Jews now returning are descendants of the original inhabitants. He points out that the United Nations was not granted by the Charter the authority to deprive a people of self-government or drive them from their lands.

Ahmed feels that, if Israel bases her claim to statehood on the 1947 U.N. resolution, she must at least recognize the boundaries recommended by the United Nations. Israel cannot in his eyes have it both ways. He demands that the Security Council should now force Israel to relinquish her gains won by the force of arms.

The Arab refugees are seen by him as the end-product of Israeli terrorism, driven from their

homes by cold-blooded massacres, such as that at Deir Yassin, where over 200 people died at the hands of the Irgun. He sees no conceivable justification for preventing refugees who wish to do so from returning to their homes as called for by the United Nations on successive occasions. In any event, he says the vast sums owed by Israel to the refugees for confiscated property should be paid promptly.

Accordingly, Ahmed does not wish his nation to cooperate with Israel in any matter and he would like to see third parties prevented from doing so. Whether this policy may also hurt him is a secondary consideration. The economic boycott maintained reflects this viewpoint. He maintains that Israel would quickly collapse were it not for United States public and private aid. Since the United States sustains Israel, he feels it must assume responsibility for Israel's actions.

Ahmed believes the city of Jerusalem should be internationalized in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations. The fact that Israel has transferred her capital to Jerusalem only indicates to him disrespect for the United Nations and the intent to seize additional territory, for no nation would locate without a purpose its capital in such an exposed position.

Although Israel talks of peace, he sees it as bent only on aggression. Proof in his eyes is such acts as Qibya and the recent attack on Nahhalin, both, he feels, deliberately planned by the Israel Government. If Israel wants peace, he believes she must demonstrate this by actions and win the confidence of her neighbors. As a first step, he says, Israel must abide by the resolutions of the United Nations, particularly with respect to boundaries and the repatriation of refugees. On this basis, he says the Arab States would be prepared to discuss a settlement.

These are the cases. And as I speak here tonight the bitterness between David and Ahmed and their people and the dangers seem, in spite of all efforts, to increase rather than diminish.

One wonders often in a position such as mine if he may not be struggling in a situation so set by the strands of the past that the history of what will happen, in spite of all of one's efforts, may have been already written—and thousands of years ago. Yet even if this be true we must to the limits of our knowledge and capability do that which seems best for the interests of the area itself and our own country.

#### Special Interests vs. Interests of Majority

When I talk about the interests of our country, I mean our country as a whole. It is only natural in a situation such as this that there would be special groups who feel strongly and attempt in all sincerity to exert the greatest possible influence on the policy of your Government. We must weigh these special interests carefully, but we



must also shape our policy and so conduct our daily acts as to represent the interests of the majority of our people where vital issues affecting our own security are concerned. I am certain no American would quarrel with this concept.

What I allude to is that a pro-Israeli, or a pro-Arab policy, has no place in our thinking. What your Government strives to put into effect is a policy (I quote the President) of "sympathetic and impartial friendship" to all the states in the Middle East. Neither side, we believe, at the moment thinks that this can be true. Both now believe we are partial to the other. Both tend to be guided by the Biblical statement: "He that is not with me is against me." It is difficult, close to impossible, for them to understand that we can be friends to both and yet be impartial in our policies.

It may be difficult and it may take long, but I am certain you will agree with me that we should so conduct ourselves in the area as to clearly demonstrate that our government has nothing except a truly objective policy. If we are to be accused of being "pro" anything, let us make it amply clear that that prefix can only apply to one thing, and that is that our policy is first and foremost "pro-American."

Specific problems of this issue are of great interest such as the refugee situation, border delineation, matters of compensation, the status of Jerusalem, an equitable division of the vital waters of the Jordan, etc., etc. These are matters which would cover many times the allotted time I have here this evening. We will judge each of these major issues and each daily friction that may arise on its merits as we see them and work unceasingly for a reconciliation which we believe to be in the best interests of all.

I shall only draw two conclusions on this situation this evening.

To the Israelis I say that you should come to truly look upon yourselves as a Middle Eastern State and see your own future in that context rather than as a headquarters, or nucleus so to speak, of worldwide groupings of peoples of a particular religious faith who must have special rights within and obligations to the Israeli state. You should drop the attitude of the conqueror and the conviction that force and a policy of retaliatory killings is the only policy that your neighbors will understand. You should make your deeds correspond to your frequent utterance of the desire for peace.

To the Arabs I say you should accept this State of Israel as an accomplished fact. I say further that you are deliberately attempting to maintain a state of affairs delicately suspended between peace and war, while at present desiring neither. This is a most dangerous policy and one which world opinion will increasingly condemn if you continue to resist any move to obtain at least a less dangerous *modus vivendi* with your neighbor.

## The Broader Issues

Turning away from the specific again to broader issues, you will readily realize that in the issue I have just described the United States is somewhat in the "middle." This is also true in many of the other disputes in the area, some of which I enumerated a few minutes ago. Difficult as the position of being in the middle may be on the issue I have just described, it is even more delicate in some of the other disputes. This is true as some of these disputes are between friendly states of the area and major allies of the United States. In such cases one cannot judge the overall interests of the United States entirely by what appear to be the merits of the particular issue locally. As an example, the North African situation has worldwide ramifications. On the one hand we see it affecting interests which France believes vital to her continued role as a world power and as affecting her role in matters of great importance to the United States, such as French Indochina and the development of an integrated Europe. On the other, we see, in the struggle for freedom in North Africa, the seeds of dissension which affect the position of the West in the entire Moslem world, which spreads from Morocco to Indonesia. All this is in addition to merits or demerits of the effect of French policy in the local area. This illustration of the worldwide ramifications of local problems could be extended if we should substitute Egypt and Iran for North Africa and the United Kingdom for France.

The United States must consider with great care the implications of throwing whatever influence we may have in such situations to one side or the other. Such a choosing of sides is often difficult in any event as, being outside parties, we can see merits on each side of the issue.

Our role in these cases is to attempt to assist both parties to arrive at an arrangement which both sides would accept as satisfactory. The fact that there be solutions of this nature to these disputes, under present world conditions, is often more important to the United States than the terms of that solution.

This is a role in which one cannot expect popularity and certainly one which we have not accepted with pleasure. When nations of the area become impatient because the United States does not more fully support the causes of their own nationalism, we might ask them to think of the historical significance of the fact that the United States, in the span of a few short years, has moved to where it is playing such a middle role. They must realize that in the end, however, their long-range interests cannot be served if the United States overplays such a role to the point of endangering the great NATO organization that is today the only organized strength of the free world against Soviet encroachment.

The analogy was recently put forward by one of our diplomatic representatives that the pres-



asures upon us were similar to a number of people tugging at one person, the United States, with a vast number of ropes. When one pulled, there was a corresponding tightening of the rope held by another. A wise Arab statesman to whom the analogy was presented suggested that the only recourse for the United States was, therefore, "to divide justice." Without arguing the concept of whether justice is in fact divisible, we do and will continue to make an honest effort to respond to the needs of our friends within the limits of our own national interests, our commitments, and our resources, but we will also recognize, as did the Arab statesman, that we cannot please all the nations and special interests which are calling upon us.

We have reluctantly inherited a position where every action or lack of action, every word spoken or left unsaid, is of significance to one or all of these nations, and it has become necessary to weigh carefully the effect in one part of the world of an attempted action in another. We must see to it that we weigh these matters carefully if we are to live up to the position of leadership in which we have been placed. Those who feel and speak with emotion on some of these problems must bear this in mind even if they are not in positions of responsibility within the government. The temper of our people is closely judged from abroad as well as our daily acts in government.

In all this range of problems it would be foolhardy to be optimistic. Yet it would be equally dangerous and quite unwarranted to be totally discouraged. Some progress is being made and there are several grounds for encouragement. One hope that I see is a steady growth of American awareness of Middle Eastern problems and a determination to see the United States fulfill its part in resolving those problems. Another hope is the general evolution now taking place in the Middle East, whereby leaders are becoming more responsive to the demands of public welfare. In fulfilling these demands there will inevitably be change amounting to virtual revolution. We are sympathetic with the motives behind this revolution and we would like to assist it as much as possible to run in an orderly productive channel.

I cannot close without asking all to weigh gravely the world in which we live today. Despite the recent events at Eniwetok, it is still hard for us to realize the unprecedented nature of the danger recent scientific achievement has brought upon us and equally hard to realize the prospects of future well-being that such discoveries, under better world conditions, could also bring.

When one considers that man is at this very time in the process of mastering weapons that could destroy our civilization, one might think that local political issues around the world should become less significant. But, when we consider how these issues could expand step by step, until

the world could be led to war, we can only dedicate ourselves humbly, with the guidance of our Creator, to strive with renewed energy to see that they are settled.

## Current Legislation on Foreign Policy: 83d Congress, 1st Session

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Tensions Within the Soviet Captive Countries: Rumania. Prepared at the Request of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress. Part 2. Sen. Doc. 70, Part 2, July 28, 1953, VI, pp. 27-51.

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Baltic States Investigation. Hearings before the House Select Committee to Investigate the Incorporation of the Baltic States into the U.S.S.R., under Authority of H. Res. 346. Part 1, November 30, December 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, and 11, 1953, XII, 678 pp.

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To Control the Exportation and Importation of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War. Hearing before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H. R. 6344, To Control the Exportation and Importation of Arms, Ammunition, and Implements of War, and Related Items, and for Other Purposes. February 25, 1954, 25 pp.

Mexican Farm Labor Program, Department of Labor. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Appropriations on H. J. Res. 461, Making an Additional Appropriation for the Department of Labor for the Fiscal Year 1954, and for Other Purposes. March 12, 1954, 21 pp.

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## Report on the Tenth Inter-American Conference

by William G. Bowdler

The Tenth Inter-American Conference met at Caracas, Venezuela, from March 1 to 28. All the American Republics participated with the exception of Costa Rica, but provision was made under which that Government may adhere to the Final Act. The Conference dealt with an agenda of 28 items covering the whole range of inter-American relations—juridical-political, economic, social, cultural, and organizational matters. It adopted 117 resolutions and 3 conventions. The Conference was also the forum in which Colombia and Peru announced the conclusion of a satisfactory agreement on the Haya de la Torre asylum case, a dispute which had been a constant source of tension between the two countries for the past 5 years.

### Juridical-Political Matters

One of the principal objectives of the United States delegation to the Tenth Inter-American Conference, which was headed by Secretary Dulles,<sup>1</sup> was to achieve maximum agreement among the American Republics upon a clear-cut and unmistakable policy determination against the intervention of international communism in the hemisphere, recognizing the continuing threat which it poses to their peace and security and declaring their intention to take effective measures, individually and collectively, to combat it. The United States proposed a resolution to this effect entitled "Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American States Against International Communist Intervention" (Annex A). The distinguishing feature of the resolution adopted, which marks a significant advance over the stands taken previously in inter-American meetings at Bogotá in 1948 and Washington in 1951, is the declaration:

That the domination or control of the political institutions of any American State by the international communist movement, extending to this hemisphere the political system of an extracontinental power, would

constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of the American States, endangering the peace of America, and would call for a meeting of consultation to consider the adoption of appropriate action in accordance with existing treaties.

Seventeen of the American Republics voted in favor of the resolution.<sup>2</sup> Mexico and Argentina chose to abstain, while Guatemala cast the only negative vote and also took the occasion to renounce its adherence to the anti-Communist resolutions adopted at Bogotá and Washington.

Amendments to this declaration prepared by other delegations suggested that it did not make adequate provision for promoting respect for human rights, for the effective exercise of representative democracy, and for the development of economic and social well-being as means for combating communism. Other proposed amendments implied concern that application of the declaration might in some way infringe upon the principles of self-determination and nonintervention. As a means of removing any doubt that the declaration is aimed at preventing, and not promoting, intervention, the United States proposed inclusion of a clear statement that the action taken is designed to protect and not impair the inalienable right of each state to choose its own form of government and economic system. The reaffirmation of traditional concepts of human rights and fundamental freedoms was included in a separate resolution entitled "Declaration of Caracas" (Annex B), as well as in other actions taken, such as the Panamanian proposal relating to the abolition of racial discrimination as a means of fighting communism.

The topic "Colonies and Occupied Territories in America" received considerable attention from a number of the delegations. Three resolutions were presented and adopted. Two of these, submitted by Argentina and Brazil, respectively, were concerned with the general subject of colonialism in the Western Hemisphere and with the areas which are the subject of dispute between Ameri-

<sup>1</sup> For the list of delegates, see BULLETIN of Mar. 15, 1954, p. 383.

<sup>2</sup> Costa Rica subsequently notified the United States of its support of the resolution.



can and non-American states. The third, proposed by Ecuador, dealt with the American Committee on Dependent Territories (ACDT). The general resolutions for the most part repeat the views expressed in previous resolutions on this subject, namely, that colonialism in the Americas should be promptly brought to an end and that just claims of American States to territories in dispute should be supported. The resolution on the ACDT contemplates the continuation of the Committee, its convocation being left up to the Council of the Organization of American States (OAS) "when circumstances make this advisable." In conformity with the position generally taken on these issues, the United States explained its inability to go along with conference action upon matters involving so clearly the interests and responsibilities of friendly governments not represented. The delegation abstained in the vote on the two general resolutions and voted against the one on the American Committee on Dependent Territories.

**Editor's Note.** Following is a list of statements made during the Caracas conference which appeared in the *Bulletin*:

"The Spirit of Inter-American Unity"—opening address by Secretary Dulles, made on March 4; *Bulletin* of March 15, p. 379.

"Intervention of International Communism in the Americas"—statements made by Secretary Dulles on March 5, March 11, and March 13; *Bulletin* of March 22, p. 419.

"Pan-American Economic Relations"—statements made by Secretary Dulles and Assistant Secretary Waugh on March 10; *Bulletin* of March 22, p. 426.

In addition, a news conference statement made by Secretary Dulles on March 16 after his return from Caracas appeared in the *Bulletin* of March 29, p. 466.

Under the chapter of the agenda dealing with juridical-political matters, six instruments were submitted to the Conference for review and approval. Due to the exigencies of time, the Committee handling these items was able to complete action on only two of them: Convention on Diplomatic Asylum and Convention on Territorial Asylum. Each of these conventions was opened for signature at Caracas, but the United States, in view of its traditional position regarding the practice of diplomatic asylum and considering a treaty on the subject of territorial asylum to be unnecessary, did not sign either instrument. The other instruments—American Treaty of Pacific Settlement, Statute for an Inter-American Court of Justice, Statute of the Inter-American Peace Committee, and Protocol to the Convention on Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife—were returned to the Council of the OAS variously for consultation with the governments,

study by the corresponding technical organ, and appropriate action by the Council itself. In returning the proposed revision of the Statute of the Inter-American Peace Committee to the Council, the Conference confirmed the continuation of the Committee and applauded its fruitful work in the interest of the peace of the continent.

### Economic Matters

From the speeches delivered in the opening debate it was evident that economic issues were of major importance to the Latin American delegates, particularly such problems as public financing of economic development; raw material prices and terms of trade; stability of, and access to, export markets; and technical cooperation. In many of the proposals introduced by Latin American delegations, it was clear that the United States was expected to provide assurances or make commitments which it was thought would provide solutions to these problems. The United States was not in a position to accept certain of those proposals, owing to the incompleteness or lack of clarity in the terminology, their one-sided provisions, or the fact that U.S. policy had not been firmly established in some fields.

One of the principal accomplishments in the economic field, as expressed by Assistant Secretary Holland, was the frankness and clarity with which the delegations presented their positions on various problems and the understanding achieved with respect to their respective viewpoints. He also pointed out that accords were being reached today on issues that had been in dispute in past years, and that the period ahead would yield agreement on problems for which solutions could not be found today. With a view to examining further, on the basis of new studies and developments, the possibility of achieving fuller agreement on practical measures for solving these problems, the Conference decided to convene a meeting of Ministers of Finance or Economy during the last quarter of 1954 in Rio de Janeiro, which will also be the IV Extraordinary Session of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council (IA-Ecosoc).

In addition to this decision, the Conference adopted 27 other resolutions relating to economic development, private investment, public financing of economic development, prices and terms of trade, trade restrictions, agricultural surpluses, agrarian reform, technical assistance, the economic resources of the continental shelf, and the future work of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council. In some of the more important resolutions on these subjects, the Tenth Conference took the following action:

1. Regarding foreign private capital, recommended that the American governments maintain and adopt suitable economic measures to attract such capital;



2. Regarding trade in strategic materials, recommended that consideration be given to the effect of decisions relating to these materials on the economies of the American States and that procedures be introduced permitting the exchange of views in order to study any practical measures relative to the adverse effects of such decisions;

3. Regarding public financing of economic development, recommended that the governments suggest to existing public-financed institutions that they give special consideration to measures to increase effectively their operations in the field of economic development in Latin America;

4. Regarding technical cooperation, decided to consider the Oas Program "as an activity of a continuing nature" and to urge the participating governments to maintain and possibly increase their present level of contributions;

5. Regarding economic resources of the continental shelf, requested the Council of the Oas to convoke a special conference in 1955 to consider as a whole the different juridical and economic aspects of this question; and

6. Regarding the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, made a series of suggestions with respect to its internal operations aimed at making it a more effective instrument for dealing with economic and social problems of the American States.

In the economic field the United States voted against the resolutions on Reductions of Restrictions on Inter-American Trade, and Terms of Trade and Prices; abstained on those dealing with Agricultural Surpluses, Agrarian Reform, and Economic Development, and Taxes on Passenger Fares in the Caribbean and Central America. The United States objection to the resolution on inter-American trade was based on the one-sided nature of the recommendation. On the terms of trade and prices resolution the United States objection was directed at the section referring to "an equitable level of remunerative prices to permit a balance in terms of trade," which seemed to imply a commitment which the United States could not accept. U.S. abstention on the last three of the resolutions listed above was explained as follows:

1. In the case of agricultural surpluses, the variable nature of the problem made it necessary for the United States not to commit itself definitively on a matter currently under intensive study in the executive and legislative branches of our government;

2. On agrarian reform, the resolution, in focusing solely on redistribution of land, followed too narrow an approach to this broad and important subject; and

3. On the question of taxes on passenger fares, that this is a matter which, for the United States, the Congress must decide.

## Social Matters

The Conference considered six broad topics in the social field, covering social aspects of economic development, human rights, housing, cooperatives, rural exodus, and social welfare. Twenty-two resolutions relating to various aspects of these topics were adopted.

The discussions revealed general awareness of the social problems accompanying economic development and of the need for governments and international agencies to give proper attention to measures in the fields of health, housing, education, and social welfare in planning and executing economic development programs. Resolutions adopted on this subject, as well as on the related topics of rural migration and social welfare work, reflect a recognition of this need and urge the governments and the appropriate organs of the Oas through training courses, seminars, specialized conferences, and technical studies to give increased attention to the development of basic social services in rural areas and the training of personnel for planning and administering sound programs. In the field of labor, an important aspect of economic development, the resolutions adopted declare the intention of governments to continue to encourage the development of free and genuinely democratic labor unions; to recommend periodic information courses for workers to provide them with a knowledge of their rights and duties; and to urge closer coordination between the Organization of American States and the International Labor Organization.

The widespread interest in the Americas in housing and in cooperatives as a means for raising economic and social standards was manifest in the various proposals adopted for encouraging further development in these fields. Measures recommended for improving housing include the convening of meetings of housing experts to advise IA-Ecosoc on activities to be carried out; the appointment of a committee of three experts to work with IA-Ecosoc on a continuing basis; and the establishment of the present Inter-American Housing Center on a permanent basis. Studies were requested on the use of standardized construction materials and the effects which the establishment of a private inter-American bank for housing would have on the problem of low-cost housing. With respect to cooperatives, the Conference requested the Pan American Union to make studies covering cooperative legislation and experience gained in the cooperative field and to provide, within its financial resources, technical assistance to the governments through training of leaders in the cooperative movement, regional seminars, and expansion of its secretariat services in connection with rural credit, consumer, low-cost housing, and multiservice cooperatives.

In addition to the Declaration of Caracas and the racial discrimination resolution referred to above, the Conference adopted certain resolutions

regarding human rights. One of these, entitled "Strengthening of the System for the Protection of Human Rights," appeared to the U.S. delegation to give appropriate attention to the point of view that the best methods for promoting respect for human rights are often found in education and example rather than through legal compulsion. In this resolution, various steps were proposed which governments might take to encourage observance of, and wider dissemination of information on, basic rights and duties of man. In the same resolution, the Pan American Union was requested to obtain periodically from the governments information relating to the progress made in promoting human rights, to effect exchange of pertinent legislation among the American States, and to undertake studies in comparative law concerning such legislation, giving preference to those rights centering around freedom of expression. A separate resolution, introduced by Uruguay, requesting the Council of the Oas to study the possibility of creating an Inter-American Court for the Protection of Human Rights, was opposed by the United States, on the grounds that such a court is premature and does not constitute an effective instrument for advancing the objective of greater respect for human rights.

#### Cultural Matters

Action of the Tenth Conference in the cultural field centered primarily on three important aspects: revision of the Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations, the need for greater efforts to promote general education, especially the eradication of illiteracy, and guidance to the organs of the Oas dealing with cultural matters in the development and execution of their programs.

Revision of the Convention for the Promotion of Cultural Relations marked a significant step in the field of cultural relations and educational exchange. This convention, which is concerned with the exchange of students and professors, was sponsored by the United States at the Buenos Aires conference in 1936. Experience with its application since that time has demonstrated that many of its detailed provisions for the selection and support of exchangees are excessively rigid and cumbersome. Revision of the convention was directed, therefore, at introducing greater flexibility in the awarding of fellowships and grants. Thus, for example, allowance is made for the parties to carry out exchange programs through direct bilateral agreements. The procedures for selecting exchangees are simplified and the financial responsibilities of the participating governments are specified more precisely and realistically. A new provision was also introduced into the convention entrusting the Pan American Union with the responsibility for compiling and circulating annually to the states members of the Oas reports on

the nature and extent of the participation of each in exchange programs. All the governments represented at Caracas signed the revised convention.

In the field of education the Conference recognized that the eradication of illiteracy is of the utmost importance and requested that special attention be given to this matter in the cultural activities for which the Council of the Oas is directly responsible as well as in the Oas Technical Cooperation Program. The governments were likewise urged to intensify their national campaigns against illiteracy, endeavoring to coordinate them with the activities of the Oas. In other resolutions bearing on education the Tenth Conference recommended to the governments the establishment of specialized educational centers for rural areas, requested the Committee for Cultural Action to undertake studies on vocational education in the American States and on the equivalence of academic degrees, commended the Pan American Union for the work it has done in organizing seminars in education and urged the governments to lend their support to development of demonstration libraries. The Conference also endorsed the idea that there should be held a meeting of Ministers and Directors of Education simultaneously with the next meeting of the Cultural Council and requested the Cultural Council to consider the desirability of holding periodic meetings of rectors, deans, and professors. Various other resolutions, including a possible convention on exchange of publications, participation in the 1946 Inter-American Copyright Convention, and support of the work of the Pan American Union in literary publications, the United States was not able to support for a variety of reasons.

A significant action of the Tenth Conference was to trace the guide lines which the governments, the Council of the Oas and the Cultural Council should follow in developing and carrying out inter-American cultural programs. The "Declaration on Cultural Cooperation" sets forth the areas in the educational, scientific, and cultural fields in which they are urged to intensify their efforts. In a resolution entitled "Inter-American Cultural Organizations" the Conference recommended to the governments a greater utilization of the cultural organs of the Organization of American States, to the Council of the Oas an increased effort to improve the functioning and coordination of its cultural organs, and to the Inter-American Cultural Council a series of points, emphasizing coordination and the establishment of priorities, which it should bear in mind in developing its program.

#### Organizational Matters

In a speech delivered during the opening debate the Secretary General of the Oas, Dr. Alberto Lleras, announced his decision to resign his post and went on to make a penetrating analysis of the Organization of American States and its



future development. In particular, he singled out the tendency of the Council of the Oas to become absorbed in trivia and to avoid matters of substance, a trend which was at times evidenced during the preparatory period for the Tenth Conference. The address paved the way for one of the more important resolutions to emerge from the Caracas meeting: Resolution XLVI entitled "Matters Assigned to the Council of the Organization of American States." The resolution, based largely on suggestions which was proposed by the United States, is designed to strengthen the Council as the permanent executive body of the Organization by specifically assigning to it several important functions.

Consideration was also given by the Conference to the functioning and composition of two other organs: the Inter-American Juridical Committee and the Committee for Cultural Action. Following the recommendation of the Council of Jurists, the Conference decided that the Juridical Committee should hold annual sessions for a fixed period of time (3 months) and that it should, as appropriate, make greater use of the Department of International Law of the Pan American Union in furnishing background material and preparing preliminary studies. The Conference rejected the concept that the members of the Committee should have no other duties than those pertaining to the Committee, but did recognize that it was essential that they devote themselves exclusively to the work of the Committee while it is in session. The following nine countries were selected to membership in the Juridical Committee: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Peru, United States, and Venezuela. The Conference did not enter into a detailed study of the functioning of the Cultural Action Committee, limiting its action to entrusting such a study to the Council of the Oas in consultation with the Inter-American Cultural Council and to establishing Mexico City as the seat of the Committee. Brazil, Cuba, Haiti, Mexico, and the United States were elected to membership in the Committee.

In other decisions on organizational matters the Conference revised the Statute of the Inter-American Commission of Women, adopted several resolutions relating to the civil, political, and economic rights of women, and entrusted to the Council of the Oas the study of administrative and fiscal policy of the Organization proposed by Brazil.

Quito, Ecuador, was designated as the site for the Eleventh Inter-American Conference, which, in accordance with the charter of the Organization, is to be held in 5 years.

• *Mr. Bowdler, author of the above article, is a foreign-affairs officer in the Office of Regional American Affairs and served as adviser to the U.S. delegation to the Tenth Inter-American Conference.*

## ANNEX A

### DECLARATION OF SOLIDARITY FOR THE PRESERVATION OF THE POLITICAL INTEGRITY OF THE AMERICAN STATES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST INTERVENTION

#### WHEREAS:

The American republics at the Ninth International Conference of American States declared that international communism, by its anti-democratic nature and its interventionist tendency, is incompatible with the concept of American freedom, and resolved to adopt within their respective territories the measures necessary to eradicate and prevent subversive activities;

The Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs recognized that, in addition to adequate internal measures in each state, a high degree of international cooperation is required to eradicate the danger which the subversive activities of international communism pose for the American States; and

The aggressive character of the international communist movement continues to constitute, in the context of world affairs, a special and immediate threat to the national institutions and the peace and security of the American States, and to the right of each State to develop its cultural, political, and economic life freely and naturally without intervention in its internal or external affairs by other States,

#### THE TENTH INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCE

##### I

#### CONDEMNES:

The activities of the international communist movement as constituting intervention in American affairs;

#### EXPRESSES:

The determination of the American States to take the necessary measures to protect their political independence against the intervention of international communism, acting in the interests of an alien despotism;

#### REITERATES:

The faith of the peoples of America in the effective exercise of representative democracy as the best means to promote their social and political progress;

and

#### DECLARES:

That the domination or control of the political institutions of any American State by the international communist movement, extending to this hemisphere the political system of an extracontinental power, would constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of the American States, endangering the peace of America, and would call for a meeting of consultation to consider the adoption of appropriate action in accordance with existing treaties.

##### II

#### RECOMMENDS:

That without prejudice to such other measures as they may consider desirable special attention be given by each of the American governments to the following steps for the purpose of counteracting the subversive activities of the international communist movement within their respective jurisdictions:

1. Measures to require disclosure of the identity, activities, and sources of funds, of those who are spreading propaganda of the international communist movement or who travel in the interests of that movement, and of those who act as its agents or in its behalf; and

2. The exchange of information among governments to assist in fulfilling the purpose of the resolutions adopted by the Inter-American Conferences and Meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs regarding international communism.



### III

This declaration of foreign policy made by the American republics in relation to dangers originating outside this hemisphere is designed to protect and not to impair the inalienable right of each American State freely to choose its own form of government and economic system and to live its own social and cultural life.

## ANNEX B

### DECLARATION OF CARACAS

#### The Tenth Inter-American Conference

##### REAFFIRMS:

The fundamental principles and aims of the Charter of the Organization of American States, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the resolutions of the Organization that refer to those principles and aims,

##### REITERATES:

Recognition of the inalienable right of each American state to choose freely its own institutions in the effective exercise of representative democracy, as a means of preserving its political sovereignty, achieving its economic independence, and living its own social and cultural life, without intervention on the part of any state or group of states, either directly or indirectly, in its domestic or external affairs, and, particularly, without the intrusion of any form of totalitarianism.

##### RENEWES:

The conviction of the American States that one of the most effective means of strengthening their democratic institutions is to increase respect for the individual and social rights of man, without any discrimination, and to maintain and promote an effective policy of economic well-being and social justice to raise the standard of living of their peoples; and

##### RESOLVES:

To unite the efforts of all the American States to apply, develop, and perfect the above-mentioned principles, so that they will form the basis of firm and solidary action designed to attain within a short time the effective realization of the representative democratic system, the rule of social justice and security, and economic and cultural cooperation essential to the mutual well-being and prosperity of the peoples of the Continent; and

##### DECLARES:

This resolution shall be known as the "Declaration of Caracas".

of the Inter-American Defense Board and under terms of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended, which authorized a program of military-grant assistance for Latin America.

Eight other American Republics are already participating in this program, which is aimed at promoting the defense of the hemisphere.

## U.S.-Canadian Arrangements for Continental Air Defense

*Statement by Charles E. Wilson  
Secretary of Defense*<sup>1</sup>

Because of the possibility of aggressive air attacks against North America, the Canadian and United States Governments after the Second World War continued the cooperative arrangements for the defense of North America which had been brought into effect during the war. Since that time, there have been established in both countries fully manned radar screens for the detection of a potential enemy, and installations for interceptor aircraft and antiaircraft weapons. At all stages, planning has been carried on between the two countries on a joint basis, and consultations and cooperation at all levels have been constant and completely satisfactory.

For some time now, the Canadian and United States Governments have been appraising the air defense system to define the steps required to strengthen our defenses in the light of recent advances in the destructive capabilities of atomic weapons against targets in our two countries.

For the past 4 years, work has been going on at high priority on the construction of a large and costly radar chain which is required not only to detect enemy bombers but also to control fighter aircraft engaged in the task of interception. This radar chain is known as the Pinetree Chain.

Long before the Pinetree project was approaching completion, the military planners of the two countries were engaged in an intensive study of what further steps might be desirable and practicable. In October 1953, a team of military and scientific advisers representing both countries recommended that additional early warning should be provided by the establishment of a further radar system generally to the north of the settled territory in Canada. The report of this team was considered by the Chiefs of Staff of each country later that same month. At a meeting in Washington in November 1953, the Canadian representatives informed the United States authorities that the Canadian Government was prepared to proceed

<sup>1</sup> Released to the press by the Department of Defense on Apr. 8; released simultaneously by the Canadian Government.

## Negotiations with Nicaragua Regarding Military Assistance

Press release 202 dated April 17

The Departments of State and Defense announced that, as a result of discussions with Nicaraguan officials which began in January of this year, negotiations will be initiated April 19 in Managua with the Government of Nicaragua, looking toward the conclusion of a bilateral military assistance agreement between the United States and Nicaragua. Negotiations are being carried out in keeping with the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance and the planning

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immediately with the necessary surveys and siting for the proposed new early warning radar system. This work is already well advanced.

There are many difficult problems to be solved in establishing this additional early warning system in the Canadian North. The system will extend over thousands of miles and its survey will involve the examination of a great number of possible sites. Much of the ground is inaccessible except by tractor train and helicopter. In many areas extreme temperatures are confronted for several months of the year. Many technical problems, including the interference of the Auroral Belt with electronic devices, have had to be overcome. In overcoming the various technical problems involved the United States Air Force is working closely with the Royal Canadian Air Force.

It is obviously just as important to have early warning of aircraft approaching target areas in North America from over the sea as from over Northern Canada. For this reason, the United States Government is extending the early warning barrier across the northeastern and northwestern seaward approaches to North America. The Alaska radar system is coordinated with those in Canada and the continental United States, and the development of airborne radar is well advanced.

In addition to these measures of common concern, both countries are working continuously to improve the air defense installations in the vicinity of the major target areas. Here too, cooperation between the United States and Canadian air defense commanders is close, and unidentified aircraft are investigated by the most immediately available interceptor force, whether Canadian or American.

The defense of North America is part of the defense of the North Atlantic Region to which both Canada and the United States are pledged as signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty. Thus, the cooperative arrangements for the defense of this continent and for the participation of Canadian and United States Forces in the defense of Europe are simply two sides of the same coin, two parts of a worldwide objective, to preserve peace and to defend freedom.

### **Appointments to International Fisheries Commissions**

The White House on April 13 announced the following appointments (Department of State press release 194) :

John L. Farley to be U.S. Commissioner on the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission.

Arnie J. Suomela to be U.S. Commissioner on the International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries.

Arnie J. Suomela to be a member on the part of the U.S. of the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries.

### **Georgescu Boys Freed**

Press release 191 dated April 12

The Department of State announced on April 12 that the young Georgescu boys, Constantin and Peter, have left Rumania to be reunited with their American parents, Mr. and Mrs. Valeriu C. Georgescu, after a separation of almost 7 years.<sup>1</sup>

Their departure from Rumania came about as a result of a long series of approaches by the Department in which President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles took a personal interest. They left Bucharest April 10 accompanied by Mr. David Mark, Second Secretary of the U.S. Legation staff. Their father met them on April 12 in Munich.

### **Indonesia Becomes Member of Fund and Bank**

The Republic of Indonesia on April 15 became a member of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development when the articles of agreement of these institutions were signed in Washington on behalf of the Government of Indonesia by Moekarto Notowidigdo, Indonesian Ambassador in Washington.

The quota of the Republic of Indonesia in the International Monetary Fund is \$110 million and its subscription to the capital stock of the bank is 1,100 shares with a total par value of \$110 million.

Fifty-six nations are now members of the fund and of the bank. Admission of Indonesia brought the total of members' quotas in the fund to \$8,848,500,000. The total subscribed capital of the bank is now \$9,148,500,000.

### **International Bank Makes Loan to Norway**

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development on April 8 made a loan of \$25 million to Norway to help carry forward economic development. The expansion of Norway's merchant fleet is one of the most important parts of this development and the loan will make available part of the foreign exchange needed for the purchase of merchant ships being built in foreign shipyards.

<sup>1</sup> For an earlier statement by the Department regarding the Georgescu case, see BULLETIN of June 8, 1953, p. 815.

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This is the bank's first loan to Norway. It is for a term of 20 years and bears interest of  $4\frac{3}{4}$  percent per annum, including the statutory 1 percent commission which is allocated to the bank's special reserve. Amortization will begin in October 1957.

The Norwegian Government has laid down the main directions of its economic policy for the next few years in the form of an investment program covering the period 1954 to 1957. Its general aim is to maintain a high level of employment and to raise living standards further by increasing both agricultural and industrial output. Since the Norwegian economy is based primarily on private enterprise, this program represents more an indication of general objectives than a plan to be followed in detail. Particular emphasis is being laid upon export industries, which account for more than one-third of the country's total production, and upon shipping, which is one of Norway's major sources of foreign exchange earnings.

During the year 1954 more than one-fifth of total Norwegian investment will be in shipping. In general, Norwegian shipowners have sufficient resources and credit in their own currency to finance this expansion. For the Norwegian economy as a whole, however, the payments to be made abroad for ships being built in foreign yards impose a heavy burden. Largely as a result of these payments, Norway will need additional amounts of foreign exchange estimated at the equivalent of \$52 million in 1954. The bank's loan will cover \$25 million of this amount; the remainder will come from Norway's own resources or from further foreign borrowing.

Norway is the third maritime nation of the world. Its merchant fleet is modern and highly efficient; about two-fifths of the tonnage is less than 5 years old and more than three-quarters is diesel driven. The bulk of the vessels operate in cargo liner service or work on long-term charter to oil companies, and only a minor number are tramp ships. Operating costs compare favorably with fleets of other nations. Although only about  $3\frac{1}{2}$  percent of the employed population is directly engaged in shipping, net foreign exchange receipts from shipping services pay for some 20 to 30 percent of imports. With the addition of ships now on order, and allowing for replacements, the merchant fleet is expected to be increased by one-quarter by the end of 1957.

Norway has developed rapidly since the end of World War II. As a result of large investments, war losses have been made good and the country now has considerably more capital equipment than it had before the war. The merchant fleet is about one-third larger, the fishing and whaling fleet has been restored and modernized, agriculture and forestry have been mechanized to a great extent, and industries and powerplants have been expanded.

The country's physical and human resources provide a broad basis for further growth, but this growth depends on an adequate supply of capital. Because of its small population, Norway's capital resources are limited and for more than a century the country has been a net importer of capital. These funds have come traditionally from the private capital markets of the United Kingdom and continental Europe. Since World War II the inflow of foreign capital has come largely from official American aid and private shipping loans. At the present time, lack of sufficient private foreign capital, together with the termination of American aid, led Norway to seek International Bank financing.

## FOA Makes Allotments to France and Spain

The Foreign Operations Administration on April 5 announced new allotments of \$13,500,000 for Spain and \$15,850,000 for France in mutual-security funds.

The new funds for Spain, in addition to \$11 million allotted last November,<sup>1</sup> are made available under an \$85 million defense support program for Spain authorized by Congress for the current fiscal year. This program is designed to strengthen the economic foundation for the joint effort of the two nations to build up the military defenses of Spain. The \$13,500,000 allotment will be used by Spain for the purchase of industrial and agricultural commodities and equipment to meet requirements of the Spanish economy.

The allotment for France, which will finance the procurement of cotton and tobacco, has been made under the provisions of Section 550 of the Mutual Security Act of 1953. This section provides that between \$100 million and \$250 million of mutual-security appropriations for the current fiscal year shall be used to finance surplus United States agricultural commodities to be sold to friendly countries for local currencies.

The local currency proceeds may be used by FOA for any of several purposes specified by Section 550. In this case, the equivalent of \$10,850,000 in French francs will be used for offshore procurement by the United States of military equipment and supplies produced in France. The remaining \$5 million equivalent in francs will be invested in economic development of French dependent territories in Africa.

FOA has now made available a total of \$202,650,000 under Section 550 to finance such surplus commodity sales to the United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, Norway, China (Formosa), Finland, Yugoslavia, Israel, Spain, Afghanistan, Japan, and France.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Nov. 16, 1953, p. 676.



## The United States and Charter Review

by David W. Wainhouse

Deputy Assistant Secretary for United Nations Affairs<sup>1</sup>

Since you may have already arrived at some conclusions regarding charter review, I am going to ask your indulgence if I go back a few steps to some of the prior considerations out of which conclusions grow.

I ask your indulgence in the hope that you may see in my remarks some touchstones against which to test your own thinking. I will therefore try to state some of the general considerations which underlie the State Department's thinking on this subject.

I will not attempt to discuss in any detail the particular problem areas which are of especial interest to the Department of State. I am sure you are fully aware that Secretary Dulles in his testimony on January 18 before the subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee<sup>2</sup> identified some of the issues, such as universality of membership, security arrangements, voting in the Security Council and the General Assembly, the development of international law, and the question of domestic jurisdiction, which may come before any review conference and thereby merit study.

Any final positions taken by the United States Government must await the crystallization of the view of the American people. There will have to be a careful assessment of the attitudes of other member states. We will rely heavily upon the advice of Congress. And certainly the views and recommendations of numerous private organizations and institutes such as yours devoting their attention to a study of charter review problems will receive our most careful consideration. The definitive conclusions will not come until the democratic processes have resulted in a more recognizable consensus within our country.

You will note that I use the expression "review of the Charter" rather than revision or amendment. I stress the word review because we should

not start on the premise that the charter is to be amended in a certain way, or necessarily amended at all. The U.S. representative made this perfectly clear at the Eighth General Assembly.

The General Assembly will hold its tenth session in 1955. Present indications are that a majority of the United Nations membership anticipate that a charter review conference will be held. A large majority at the recent Eighth Assembly session in 1953 recommended to the United Nations Secretariat that it complete certain preparatory work prior to the review conference. This is to consist of the publication of some unpublished documents of the original San Francisco conference in 1945, a survey of the precedents set by the United Nations organs in their operations under the charter, and a comprehensive index to the legislative history of the charter.

### Justification for Charter Review

Secretary Dulles said in his speech of January 18 that the United States "expects to favor the holding of a review conference." It seems to me that the case for charter review is clearcut for two principal reasons:

First, it is a matter of simple good faith for the United States to support the holding of the review conference. At San Francisco in 1945 some provisions were adopted over rather strong opposition on the part of many, particularly the smaller states. They adopted the Charter on the assumption that they would be given an opportunity to reexamine the charter provisions after a 10-year trial. At San Francisco the United States indicated that it would support the holding of such a conference after a period of 10 years. If a majority of the member states desire a charter review conference, we should certainly support it.

The second reason involves American leadership in the setting of contemporary world politics. The world has been divided by "iron" and "bamboo" curtains. There is a trend toward bipo-

<sup>1</sup> Address made before the Institute on United Nations Charter Review at the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn., on Apr. 10 (press release 186 dated Apr. 9).

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Feb. 1, 1954, p. 170.

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larity. Almost 9 years after the end of World War II, we have still not concluded the principal treaties of peace and we still suffer from the legacy of destruction and loss of manpower. The Communists have enslaved millions and there is the constant threat of enslaving millions more. New states have arisen. Former enemy states are moving back into the family of nations. Others, such as India, are achieving greater stature in international affairs. Within the United Nations the charter assumption of the unity of the Great Powers has broken down with the result that the role of the Security Council has been eclipsed and the role of the General Assembly enhanced. And above the whole scene hovers the new and awesome character of modern weapons of warfare. We do not feel that these forces can somehow be legislated out of existence. Indeed, the present charter could carry far more traffic than it presently does, if there were the will on both sides to cooperate for peace. But in the light of these developments, and considering the special role thrust on our country today, it is logical that we should review the charter to determine whether the dynamic political changes since World War II make it desirable to change the charter itself.

It is now time to ask some basic questions about our general approach to charter review. First, what kind of problem is it? Secondly, what are the proper limits of a charter review conference? Thirdly, what are our objectives?

#### **Nature of the Charter Review Problem**

Charter review is essentially a political problem. When we talk about review of the charter, inevitably we are talking about world politics and political relationship among sovereign states. The United Nations today is an association of states where decisions are implemented through voluntary action by these states. This fact places certain limitations on charter review as we will see later.

We are aware that the difficulties encountered in the operation of the United Nations today are a product of political attitudes and actions of governments. We recognize that dynamic societies oftentimes place great strains on the legal documents which guide their actions. We know that we have to look at the practical relationships between the charter and political reality. We know that our task is to determine whether changes in the charter can foster desirable and feasible developments from the point of view of the national interest of the United States and the parallel interests of the free world.

This immediately raises the corollary question of how the United Nations has worked in the past 8 years. I should not want to give the impression that we believe the United Nations is a perfect instrument, or that it operates just as we want it to. Not at all. It has its full share of faults.

We have had less than 9 years of experience with this new tool. That is a very short time in the history of political institutions. It is long enough to reveal shortcomings, but not long enough to correct them all. We know that U.N. action is cumbersome. It is generally slow. Being without coercive power, in the sense that a state has political power, spokesmen in the United Nations sometimes indulge in irresponsible talk or action. What is more serious is a tendency in the United Nations to push this fledgling organization too fast and too far. Member states which have recently gained their own independence, for example, are prone to demand complete and immediate independence for all other dependent territories, whether or not these territories are ready for it and whether or not they can support themselves or protect themselves.

Despite the imperfections I have just noted, the United Nations has adapted its practices to a fast-changing world. It is equally apparent that we have scarcely begun to realize the great potentialities of the United Nations. One might say of the charter, as Chief Justice Marshall said of the Constitution of the United States that "it was intended to endure for ages to come, and it is consequently to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs." The charter is not rigid or static. Like our own Constitution, the charter was made flexible enough to be adaptable to the exigencies which in the words of Chief Justice Holmes, "cannot have been foreseen by the most gifted of its begetters."

The broad and comprehensive strokes used by the framers of the charter have permitted developments to take place not entirely envisaged at San Francisco. Let me give you two concrete examples of how this 8-year old organization has demonstrated a high degree of constitutional adaptability.

The first relates to the veto. Article 27 (3) of the charter provides that the Security Council shall make decisions on nonprocedural matters "by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members." On the face of the charter this would mean that each great power must vote *yes* or a resolution will fail. Actually, the constitutional practice of abstention has developed so that a resolution supported by any seven members is not defeated unless a great power votes *no*. Moreover, the practice of abstention has been extended so that deliberate *absence* by a great power, such as the Soviet absence during the June 25 and 27 debates on Korea in the Security Council, will not prevent that organ from acting. Since this experience in 1950, the Soviet Union has not ventured to boycott the Security Council.

The most significant demonstration of United Nations flexibility in light of changing political conditions is the "Uniting for Peace" resolution which was adopted by the General Assembly in



November 1950.<sup>3</sup> This is the broad response of the United Nations to Soviet vetoes and obstructionism which have prevented the Security Council from exercising its primary responsibility of the maintenance of international peace and security. Now the General Assembly can meet in emergency session and recommend collective measures, including the use of force, to members in the event the Security Council is unable to act. The fact that one organ is paralyzed means that other United Nations organs have had to assume greater functions. The harm done by the abuse of the veto in the Security Council has led to the compensating activity of the General Assembly through the "Uniting for Peace" mechanism.

#### Limits of Charter Review

If the charter review problem is essentially political, it is the greater part of wisdom that at the outset we place certain limitations on the kinds of amendments we may seek. For our part, we feel that extreme proposals should be avoided. We do not intend that the review conference destroy U.N. functions and assets as they now exist.

Thus, to map the problem of charter review, I believe that an agreed scale, with agreed dimensions and boundaries, is necessary, so that an agreed course can be charted. The Department has done this to focus and direct its own thinking.

There are a number of theoretically possible extremes which we in the State Department have already ruled out in our own approach to this problem. These extremes would include such things as trying to write a brand new charter. We feel this would open a Pandora's box, making it difficult, if not impossible, to reassemble anything like the present United Nations. As Secretary Dulles said, "The United Nations as it is, is better than no United Nations at all."<sup>4</sup>

The map with which we are working, and on which we are trying to chart a reasonable course, also has on its extreme limits proposals to establish some sort of superstate; to expel those we do not like; and to withdraw United States participation.

So far as a "superstate" is concerned, I would remind you that we must work with the material at hand, with the world as it is. We live in a world of sovereign nations and we are working mightily to develop a level of cooperation among them which would begin to make possible the fulfillment of the commitments embodied in the present charter.

Obviously, a voluntary association of states is not adequate in itself to give us a binding guarantee that there will be no war. But the United Nations as a voluntary association does afford to all peace-loving states a reasonable assurance that they will have friends and allies if they are wan-

tonly attacked by an aggressor. It also works in many ways to prevent wars before they can start. President Eisenhower has called it a "sheer necessity" and has said that it is "man's best organized hope to substitute the conference table for the battlefield."<sup>5</sup> The charter review conference must not hamper these vital aspects of United Nations activity. We do not believe that it could profitably devote itself to the attempt to create a superstate.

Neither do we believe that proposals to reorganize the United Nations without the Soviet Union are within the proper scope of the review conference. There is the practical difficulty that, while article 5 and 6 permit suspension and expulsion, such action would require agreement of the Security Council, which in turn is subject to the veto. There is the further consideration that, as Secretary Dulles has said, "most of the members of the United Nations feel that it is better to have even discordant members in the organization . . ."<sup>6</sup> I would add that, while there is no doubt that the Soviet bloc has consistently flouted the principles of the charter, the advantage in having them within the United Nations is that they are forced to lay bare their record of hypocrisy before the bar of world opinion. The articles of the charter provide us with a standard for judgment of Soviet performance. That the United States and the free world are winning the battle of ideas within the forum of the United Nations is demonstrated by the fact that the United Nations has failed to adopt a single major Soviet proposal to which we objected during its entire history. As Ambassador Lodge puts it, the Russians cannot control the United Nations; they cannot break it up; they do not dare leave it.

Without the Soviets, the United Nations' chance of serving as a channel for East-West negotiations, as in the ending of the Berlin blockade, would be gone. Of most serious concern is that if they were to be ousted from the United Nations, it is possible that the organization might break up.

Finally, in spite of our abhorrence of Soviet policies or the obvious shortcomings of the United Nations, we do not look to the charter review conference as a vehicle for our own withdrawal. There is no country which has more to gain from the successful functioning of the United Nations than does the United States. The United Nations cannot do as we would wish it to do in every instance. If the United Nations is a mirror which often reflects disturbing realities of our world, the solution is not to smash the mirror. If the United Nations is also, as Ambassador Lodge suggests, a loudspeaker, we do not attack the loudspeaker, we use it. Our withdrawal would mean handing the Soviet Union a golden opportunity to

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Nov. 20, 1950, p. 823.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Feb. 1, 1954, p. 173.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, Oct. 5, 1953, p. 457.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, Feb. 1, 1954, p. 171.



organize a world community in its own image. In an interdependent world, in which the oceans no longer divide us from other countries and in which communications have become universalized, there can be no go it alone. The United States no longer has the choice of isolating itself from the rest of the world. We are a world power. Our interests are not and cannot be confined to any one area. They are worldwide. In concert with our free world allies, we must continue to pool our strength—military, political, economic, and moral—to the advantage of ourselves and the free world.

#### What We Hope To Achieve by Charter Review

I have stated the case for charter review, its essentially political nature, which in turn places certain limits on extreme proposals. It is also apparent from what I have said that we do not visualize the charter review conference as a panacea, a cure-all, a magic wand which by some feat of legerdemain can alleviate the ills of the world. It is not our intention to foster the same kind of over-optimism with respect to charter review which was prevalent at San Francisco in 1945. Changes in language alone cannot transform the behavior of nations. If our view is tempered by the knowledge that politics is the art of the possible, that charter review will require the wisdom and self-restraint of statesmanship and diplomacy, then it is legitimate to ask what do we hope to achieve at any review conference? Would any review conference be a futile exercise in light of the Soviet veto on all charter amendments?

Not at all. Let me quote for you the words of Secretary Dulles:

The existence of this veto does not mean that the Review Conference is a futility. At San Francisco each of the nations which had joined to draft the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals had a "veto" over changes from these proposals. Nevertheless, they did not exercise that veto as against changes which were clearly reasonable and demanded by world opinion. We can hope that the same conditions will prevail at the prospective Review Conference. We can reasonably make our plans on the working hypothesis that no one nation will, in fact, be able arbitrarily to impose changes or to veto changes.<sup>1</sup>

As a minimum a review of the charter and constitutional procedures and practices should bring greater understanding to our people and to the peoples of the world as to how essential the United Nations is to the peace, security, and well-being of Americans and the rest of the free world. It should bring about an understanding of the extent to which the potentialities of the charter are being realized. It can help measurably to refurbish the faith we have in the present charter without raising false hopes and expectations.

This is a minimum. Our greater objective is to strengthen the United Nations in all its aspects

on the premise that this will foster the national interests of the United States and the free world. Charter review can nurture the common consensus among the freedom-loving peoples and thereby make the United Nations more effective as an instrument of peace, security, and well-being, provided, of course, that any differences of opinion will not be pressed to the point where the solidarity of the free world is disrupted and the United Nations is torn asunder.

The United Nations is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky. It is not a self-operating mechanism which will automatically maintain and enforce peace. It is rather an instrument which can aid us to understand the strife, trouble, and human need which exist in the world today and provide us with the means to work in cooperation with other nations for the peaceful solution of common problems. It is an instrument which affords nations the opportunity to combine their moral and material strength in support of the great principles of the charter. The effectiveness of the United Nations depends not only upon the lettered provisions of the charter but upon the will and determination of the peoples of the world to make it work. To the extent that charter review can help to develop this will and determination, it will have served the interests of the United States and of the free world.

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<sup>1</sup> Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, Feb. 1, 1954, p. 173.

## Discussions on Status of Women

Statements by Mrs. Lorena B. Hahn

U. S. Representative on the U. N. Commission on the Status of Women<sup>1</sup>

### POLITICAL RIGHTS OF WOMEN

U.S./U.N. press release dated March 23

[Excerpts]

In 1900 women could vote in only one country, New Zealand, and in four of the states of the United States. Today, women vote on equal terms with men in 60 countries. Two countries, Mexico and Syria, have moved from the limited suffrage to the full suffrage column since we last met. The Secretary-General's memorandum lists only 17 independent countries in which women are denied the vote. All this progress has come in a brief half-century—for many of us, within our own lifetime. This should be a source of great encouragement to us, for it means that the peoples of our world are ready for change and are seeking more participation by women in public life.

This progress is even more amazing when we realize, as we can from Table V, that 24 countries have taken action favorable to woman suffrage since the signing of the charter in 1945—only 9 years ago. Many of the countries listed have been members of our Commission, or are members now. China, long one of our members, took action in 1947, Costa Rica and Syria in 1949, Haiti in 1950, Greece and Lebanon in 1952, and Mexico in 1953. The report shows that every country which has become a member of this Commission without woman suffrage has granted women the right to vote, at least in part, before leaving our Commission.

This is a proud record—not that we can take credit for the persistent leadership which has won the vote for women in these areas, but because we feel that this Commission has had a part in encouraging governments to take the formal action recognizing the capacity and the wisdom of including women in their electorate.

<sup>1</sup> Made in the Commission on Mar. 23, Mar. 25, and Apr. 5.

Because today women vote almost everywhere, we must guard against a feeling that we need not concern ourselves about those 17 countries where women lack political rights. The principle of equality is as important in one country as in any other, and we cannot relax until women have equal suffrage in all countries. Legislative action has been started in some of these countries.

I have been especially interested in the documents on the status of women in trust and non-self-governing territories. I had not realized, for instance, the extent to which the people in these areas are exercising suffrage, and, again, how rapidly the opportunities to share in the election process is being extended. In the French Cameroons, for instance, our report shows that suffrage has been extended equally, and that in the brief space of 8 years it has been possible to increase the number of persons exercising the vote from less than 16,000 to 580,000. In some of these areas we find that there is already universal and equal suffrage. It is extremely difficult to generalize about the status of women in areas which differ so vastly. In each of the reports, however, one feels that the administering authority is working to encourage women to participate in public life. It was gratifying to note that in the South Pacific Conference last year there were women in official delegations.

All this makes it evident that our Commission can now concentrate more on establishing a climate of acceptance for women as voters. I have heard of places where the first women to go to the polls were jeered as they passed—not just by men, but by women also. Developing a climate of acceptance is a long-range job. It needs doing where women have voted for many years, as well as in countries where the vote is new. We are still working toward this goal in the United States. The pamphlet on *Political Education of Women* is designed for this purpose.



## EQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK

U.S./U.N. press release dated March 25

The U.S. delegation welcomes this opportunity to discuss equal pay for equal work for men and women. We regard equal pay—payment of the rate for the job irrespective of the sex of the worker—as fundamental to a sound economic system. In my comment today I would like to do two things:

*First*, to examine the current equal pay situation against the background of the Commission's work in this field.

*Second*, to suggest a new and expanded approach to increase the effectiveness of our work.

### The Current Equal Pay Situation

We can take pride in the Commission's record in the field of equal pay. Equal pay is a subject to which our Commission has devoted attention almost from the time of its establishment. In fact, it might be said that the Status of Women Commission furnished the impetus for the adoption by the ILO [International Labor Organization] of the Convention and Recommendation on Equal Remuneration for Work of Equal Value. I refer to the resolution adopted by the Status of Women Commission at its second session, in January 1948, in which it invited the ILO and non-governmental organizations to compile memoranda setting forth what action they were taking to promote equal pay for men and women and so implement the principle of the U.N. Charter that there shall be no discrimination based on sex.

At its third session, in April 1949, in Lebanon, the Commission reaffirmed its interest and requested the ILO to include the following points in its study:

1. Adoption of the principle of the "rate for the job" rather than of a rate based on sex;
2. Granting to women the same technical training and guidance, access to jobs, and promotion procedures as those granted to men;
3. Abolition of the legal or customary restrictions on the pay of women workers; and
4. Provisions to lighten the tasks that arise from women's home responsibilities.

At our fourth session, in May 1950, the ILO reported that it had sent a questionnaire to governments on equal pay law and practice, and stated that the ILO study was taking into account the Commission's suggestions, particularly the concept of wage rates based on job content rather than the worker's sex.

### U.S. SITUATION

The report on equal pay prepared by the ILO for this session of the Commission shows the progress

which has been made through official action toward gaining acceptance of the equal pay principle. Before commenting on this report, however, I would like to make a few brief statements on the equal pay situation for women in the United States.

The situation in the United States with respect to equal pay is generally good. We have equal pay throughout the Federal Civil Service and in the States where State civil service systems are in effect. In private industry, management and labor to an increasing extent are incorporating the equal pay principle in collective-bargaining agreements. Equal pay laws for workers in private industry are in effect in approximately 1/4 of our States. These States are the big industrial States; approximately half of all employed women in the United States live in the 13 States that have equal pay laws. Equal pay bills are pending in the Federal Congress, both in the House and in the Senate.

In the United States we are proud of this progress. However, here as well as in many other countries, there is still a big job to be done before all women workers receive equal pay with men.

### CURRENT ILO REPORT

The ILO documentation for this session (Report E/CN.6/231) contains favorable information on national action in connection with the ILO Convention and Recommendation. The United States has carried out its responsibilities by bringing this convention to the attention of the States for appropriate action. The ILO Convention went into force in May 1953 on ratification by Belgium, Mexico, and Yugoslavia. The report shows that, since the last session, three additional countries have ratified, i. e., France, the Dominican Republic, and Austria.

The report shows a constructive and judicious attitude among the various governments toward the equal pay principle. Several recommended a study of the standards and conditions which now block the adoption of equal pay. In Finland, such a study was recommended by the Parliament. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the Government proposed setting up a tripartite committee to study the problem. In the Netherlands, a Council composed of representatives of labor and industry as well as of government reported on the problem.

The ILO report states that Norway is looking forward to putting the equal pay principle into effect in collective-bargaining agreements and that Sweden expects to take action toward equalizing men's and women's wages. Switzerland is studying the effect of the equal pay system on its economy. In the United Kingdom, the London County Council has adopted the principle of equal pay for employees whose wages are negotiated between the Council and its Staff Association.

The report represents a sizeable cross section of countries. It reflects the attitudes of labor and industry as well as of governments. Therefore, it seems clear that we can expect additional gains in putting the equal pay principle into practice through official action.

#### **Suggestions for Future Program**

Here in the Commission, through our discussion and exchange of information on activities in our various countries, we have an opportunity to promote public education for voluntary acceptance of equal pay. We are an important forum for discussion not only of the progress being made in our respective countries, but of the methods being used for achieving that progress.

This brings me to the second major part of my statement, which deals with methods to give broader effectiveness to the equal pay principle. I would like to discuss first, popular misconceptions of the meaning of equal pay; and second, the importance of building up an informed public opinion in support of the equal pay principle.

#### **POPULAR MISCONCEPTIONS**

Some of the comments noted in the ILO progress report indicate the nature of the educational work that needs to be done. Although the tone of the report on the whole is encouraging and constructive, it also shows some underlying misconceptions about the importance of women to the economy of their various countries and the value of the work which women do. For example, in several of the countries there appears to be a prevailing belief that men are entitled to higher wage rates on the ground that men have family responsibilities and women do not.

The experience of the United States has shown the fallacy of these contentions. Women's Bureau studies show that most women work through economic necessity, to support themselves and others. All but a small percent of married women workers regularly contribute to family support. Nor is marital status the only criterion as to whether a worker has family responsibilities. In the United States most single persons, women as well as men, have to work for a living. In addition to their own support, many single persons are also responsible for the support of aged parents or other relatives.

In the United States, women are now almost one-third of our total labor force: one in every three workers is a woman. Married women workers outnumber single women workers; over half of all employed women in the United States today are married women living with their husbands.

The presence of large numbers of women in the labor force carries with it the potential threat of competition between men and women on wage rates. This aspect of equal pay is overlooked in

the government comments reported by the ILO. If women can be hired at lower rates than men, they constitute a threat to men's wages and to the maintenance of sound labor standards generally. On the other hand, putting equal pay into practice gives workers of both sexes greater wage and job security. It discourages hiring women for less money or replacing men by women hired at lower rates. It protects fair employers from unfair competition by those who attempt to use women to undercut men's wages.

Even where men are not actually replaced by women workers, the threat of such replacement may be used to force wage cuts. The existence of a pool of labor available for employment at cheaper rates can always be used to the disadvantage of workers on the job.

Protection of wage and job security is one of the advantages of equal pay. Another is that equal pay gives workers more money to spend. In our system of free enterprise, it is important to keep consumer purchasing power at a high level. In plain language, this means that if people have the money to buy goods, then factories will have the money to keep producing goods and to pay wages; and people, in turn, will have money to buy goods. This is sound economics; it has helped us to achieve and maintain a high standard of living in the United States.

#### **EDUCATING PUBLIC OPINION**

The ILO report indicates the need to create a favorable climate of public opinion as a basis for applying the principle of equal pay. The members of this Commission and of the nongovernmental organizations can help to do this in our own spheres of work through the process of education.

Considerable confusion still exists as to what equal pay really means. Some people think of it in terms of the total paycheck; that is, if a man and a woman are doing similar work, the week's earnings should be the same. Actually equal pay refers to rates of pay. If one person works longer hours or produces a larger quantity, he or she will earn a larger amount although the rates are the same.

We need to keep emphasizing the fundamental principle that the worker should receive the rate for the job irrespective of sex. In other words, the rate of pay should be set for the job itself, without distinction as to whether a man or a woman is to receive it. Jobs that are designated as men's jobs or women's jobs raise questions as to whether the rate is based on the worker's sex rather than on job requirements.

The agencies best fitted to carry out the educational activities needed are the nongovernmental organizations, the women's organizations and the unions that are associated with the work of this Commission. In the United States, one of these

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organizations, the National Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs, has taken leadership in the equal pay field. One of its methods, for example, is the use of an "equal pay kit," containing materials for use by their clubs in support of equal pay at State, national, and international levels; a radio script on equal pay; a suggested speech; a suggested program for a meeting; articles in its monthly magazine; and various other materials. This organization also emphasizes the need for vocational training opportunities to fit women for higher level jobs where they will qualify for the same work and pay as men.

Another interesting example of recent public-opinion activities in the equal pay field was carried on by a member of the Federal Congress prior to her introduction of a Federal equal pay bill. In an extensive study covering almost a year, she sent questionnaires to about a thousand leaders in American labor, business, education, and women's affairs. The experts who replied almost all agreed with the principle of equal pay and a majority were in favor of Federal legislation to enforce it. This public opinion poll was extremely useful in stimulating public support for the bill.

I am sure that in many other countries similar educational work is going forward. I would therefore like to suggest that the Secretary-General obtain from nongovernmental organizations an account of the steps being taken on an unofficial basis in the various countries to promote public education and acceptance of the principle of equal pay. In addition to the ILO report dealing with official action, such an account of unofficial activities would be helpful to this Commission. It would enable each of us to profit from her neighbor's experience and would provide many useful ideas for voluntary programs to help give practical meaning and effect to equal pay.

We also look forward to hearing statements by nongovernmental organizations at the current session. These will furnish concrete examples of the type of information that the Commission could hope to obtain from an account of this kind next year.

#### EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR WOMEN

U.S./U.N. press release dated April 5

Our discussion this year indicates that education for women has become an important, if not the most important, field of action for our study and planning. Education provides women with the knowledge and the confidence to use the rights they have gained—their rights and responsibilities as citizens, as wives and mothers, as workers, and as individuals. The word education means much more than schools, or literacy, or the study of books. Voters who could not read and write have repeatedly demonstrated understanding of issues

and maturity of judgment. All of us here today are grateful for the wisdom which has been handed down through generations from person to person. Education embraces the whole of culture, and the manner in which we gain our knowledge should never be confused with knowledge itself.

The problem we face in this Commission is that in many countries there are women who have never had an opportunity to learn much of their world, and there are girls today who are not having the same opportunity as their brothers to go to school. The causes for such denial of opportunity are many and various, but they are not unconquerable. The report we have before us, the UNESCO report on access of women to education (E/CN.6/250), is valuable for exactly this reason—it provides us not only with careful statistics, but also with some analysis of the problems which account for the variations between continents and countries. Another document which seems to us of great value is the report of the Committee on Non-Self-Governing Territories on the *Education of Girls* (A/AC.35/L.133).

I would like to discuss the situation regarding education on the basis of these documents, with particular attention to three problems:

*First*, assurance for girls of full educational opportunities.

*Second*, more teachers, and more women in teaching.

*Third*, scholarships and fellowships for women.

I believe you all have before you the resolution on education introduced by six delegations, including the United States.<sup>2</sup> This resolution deals with the three points I have just stated.

#### Full Educational Opportunities for Girls

The UNESCO report is to be commended on many grounds. One of these is the plan to survey education for girls over a 3-year period, so that we can consider in greater detail the progress achieved in primary, secondary, and higher education. This seems a wise division of material, and our delegation expresses satisfaction with it. The second chapter of the report, on UNESCO activities in 1953, is also of interest.

#### U.S. COMMISSION ON THE EDUCATION OF WOMEN

The UNESCO report mentions a Commission on the Education of Women set up recently in the United States. This is a voluntary effort, sponsored by one of our professional organizations, the American Council on Education. The Commission is being paid for by private sources and not by Government funds. Among its members are a

<sup>2</sup> U.N. doc. E/CN.6/L.145. The resolution, as amended, was adopted on Apr. 7 by a vote of 16-0, with the United Kingdom abstaining.

number of college presidents, both men and women, and certain government officials serving in their private capacity. Its director is a Dean of Women in one of our great American universities.

The Commission has issued a statement on its proposed study. It recognizes that the primary responsibilities of American women relate to the family and the home. It also recognizes that more and more women are assuming expanded roles in other vocations and in community interests. The Commission is not interested in securing special privileges for women. It is concerned with the welfare of the United States and with the contribution every person can make to our society. The proposed study therefore includes research on the special aptitudes of women, on the influence of education, culture patterns, and social attitudes upon women and on their contribution as distinct from those of men. It does not look forward to a plan of education for women which will be different from that of men, but rather that the curricula for all students can be enlarged to provide an understanding of the role which women play, and should be prepared to play, in our society.

Turning back to the UNESCO report, I would like to comment on the emphasis in some countries on special curricula for girls. It is natural and healthy that girls should wish to study domestic science and home economics and all the aspects of family life. Without such interests few women will feel that their lives have been satisfying. Courses in cooking, sewing, home nursing, and child care are usually offered in our schools on an elective basis, so that a girl choosing these courses is not able to take others scheduled at the same time. The same problem appears in vocational training, where it is often expected that the girls will elect home economics while the boys study agriculture. I speak with some feeling on this, because I live in a farm area and know that a farmer needs a wife who understands his work. It is therefore not just a matter of providing the same choices for girls and boys, but also of presenting these courses in ways which will not make it necessary for a girl who chooses domestic science to lose out on opportunities to study other fields.

#### FUNDAMENTAL EDUCATION

The discussion of fundamental education begins with a description of objectives which will help us clarify our recommendations. While fundamental education is intended for adults, men and women alike, who have not had an opportunity to go to school, its aim is to raise the standard of living of people, improve their health conditions, and help them become informed citizens. The discussion includes a sentence which applies in many aspects of our work: "No fundamental

education project is really successful in changing the conditions of a community if it is limited to men." A country can achieve full development only when women are able to carry responsibilities as partners in all phases of civic life. From this point of view the success of the emergency program for Arab refugees in attracting girls to school promises well for their future.

The same view is expressed in the report of the Education of Girls in Non-Self-Governing Territories. The introduction to this report says,

All improvements in the homes and in the bringing up of children will be delayed until a great drive is made to educate women and girls. . . . If men from primary or secondary schools marry wives who have had no schooling . . . the educated fathers will have the greatest difficulty in passing on the benefits of their schooling to the children.

The progress apparent in this report is astonishing; while there are still gaps, there are areas in which the proportion of girls in the total enrollment approaches the expected 50 percent.

#### More Teachers and More Women in Teaching

A universal problem in these days seems to be a shortage of teachers. In some countries the shortage reflects inadequate pay scales; in others it is due to a lack of training facilities and recruits. The countries where fewer girls attend school, and for shorter periods, are for the most part in this second group, and until more teachers can be found, there will not be enough schools to go around. In the United States, most of our teachers have been women. This is true especially in our primary grades, possibly because we think of primary schools as a first transition from the home. In countries where women have not been a large part of the teaching force, it would seem easy for them to be accepted first in the primary grades. However, I would not wish this comment to be taken in any way as a limitation, for in the United States some of our greatest university professors and secondary school teachers are women who are recognized everywhere for ability and capacity.

#### Fellowships and Scholarships

A final section of the UNESCO report deals with scholarships and other opportunities for study in foreign countries. As we expected, fewer women than men have received grants, and in some cases the disproportion seems unduly great. We should not expect that young women will undertake advanced study to the same extent as young men, for it is just at this point that girls tend to marry and need to be at home with their children. We should therefore feel encouragement that in almost all categories listed, some girls and women are included. This proportion should increase, for choices seem to be made in terms of qualifications without regard to sex. However, this is a



matter in which we cannot afford to be idle, and the resolution we have proposed includes a statement on scholarships, particularly in relation to the need for more women trained for leadership in education.

Our resolution also suggests that UNESCO provide in future reports an analysis, first, on methods which seem to have been helpful in increasing school attendance by girls, and second, on expanding the use of women as teachers in areas where it has not been customary to employ them. I understand that much of this information may already be available in the material which comes into UNESCO regularly from governments on implementing Resolution 32 of the 14th International Conference on Public Education, which discussed compulsory education and its prolongation, and in other reports from these conferences. In view of the large number of countries sponsoring this resolution, we hope it will have serious consideration.

### Israel-Jordan Border Situation

*Statement by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.  
U.S. Representative to the United Nations*<sup>1</sup>

The present situation in Palestine is one that must be taken very seriously. It should not be treated in a procedural narrow way which would obscure the necessity for measures not only to prevent the continuance of the disturbances but also to look for more far-reaching solutions. It seems to me that anyone who has been following recent events in Palestine, whether he is an expert on the Security Council or whether he is a private citizen, would be immediately aware that there is more involved here than findings under individual complaints of violations of the Armistice Agreements. The complaints listed on the agenda cannot in our opinion be separated into airtight compartments.

Let me make clear at once that the United States is seriously concerned when any government—especially any member of the United Nations bound by agreements approved by the Security Council and by her obligations under the charter—presumes to take the law into her own hands in a policy of reprisal and retaliation. We made this perfectly clear at the time that we discussed the

Qibya incident in this Council,<sup>2</sup> and I wish to state now that we continue to hold this view. This repeated resort to this policy of reprisal and retaliation must stop.

Reference has been made by several speakers to the finding of the Israel-Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission concerning the attack on the village of Nahhalin which is, in our opinion, a matter of utmost gravity of a type clearly deserving of condemnation. But also it is not enough in an affair of this kind to have discussions, to make findings and to issue condemnations. The situation along the Israel-Jordan border since the passage of the resolution on Qibya, on the 24th of November 1953,<sup>3</sup> has not improved. This Council recognized at that time the obligations of both Israel and Jordan under Security Council resolutions and the General Armistice Agreement to prevent all acts of violence on either side of the demarcation line, and reaffirmed that it is essential in order to achieve progress by peaceful means toward a lasting settlement of the issues outstanding that the parties abide by their obligations. It was in that connection that the Council recognized the necessity of strengthening the Truce Supervision Organization and of considering such additional measures as might be necessary to carry out the objectives of the Qibya resolution.

In our opinion it has become abundantly clear that complaints such as those included in our provisional agenda are interrelated. If we are to take constructive action which will be helpful to the parties themselves and conducive to peace in the area, we must treat them as interrelated in our consideration here. This is not only a matter of principle but it is really the only practical way of dealing with the present situation if this Security Council is to continue to play a useful role in the maintenance of international peace and security as regards this problem.

While we need not in our opinion be bound by precedent in such matters as these, and while I think we should fit our procedure to the problem before us, the course of action which I propose is based on sound precedent. Members of the Council will recall that at the 514th meeting of October 20, 1950, the provisional agenda headed "The Palestine Question:" had six subitems involving alleged violations of two different armistice agreements and it was decided that when the Council began its debate it would be permissible to refer to each of the subitems while dealing with the first.

Mr. President, it is in that spirit that the United States approaches this debate.

<sup>1</sup> Made in the Security Council on Apr. 8 (U.S./U.N. press release 1899).

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Dec. 14, 1953, p. 839.

<sup>3</sup> For text, see *ibid.*, p. 840.

## Report of U. N. Command Operations in Korea

### SEVENTY-SIXTH REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD AUGUST 16-31, 1953<sup>1</sup>

U.N. doc. S/3185  
March 12, 1954

I herewith submit report number 76 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 16-31 August 1953, inclusive.

Marking of the Demarcation Line and the clearing of hazards within the Demilitarized Zone continued under the supervision of Joint Observer Teams. Both sides agreed in principle that bona fide residents of the Demilitarized Zone would be permitted to move in and out of the zone in order to maintain livelihood.

Early in the reporting period the Communists notified the United Nations Command that personnel would be sent into the Demilitarized Zone to engage in the construction of facilities for captured personnel not to be directly repatriated. This was the first official evidence that the Communists would have non-repatriates. On 19 August the Communists delivered a roster of deceased United Nations Command military personnel. The total number reported was 1,078. Agreement was later reached on a program of recovery of bodies of deceased personnel from the Demilitarized Zone under the control of the other side.

By the end of the period the initial stages of organization for the implementation of the Armistice had been nearly completed. It is considered by the United Nations Command that a satisfactory spirit of co-operation with regard to implementation of the Armistice exists in most areas.

Repatriation of captured personnel continued during the period. As for the prisoners themselves, those in the United Nations Command custody who desired repatriation generally were docile and co-operative until they approached the exchange point. As each group neared

Panmunjom, the returning prisoners, apparently by pre-arranged plan and on order, gave startlingly similar performances by discarding clothing, shouting, and throwing various materials at United Nations Command officials. By 31 August, however, the United Nations Command had returned to Communist control a total of 61,415 prisoners. By the same date, the following numbers of United Nations Command personnel had been released from Communist captivity:

United States.....	2,827
Other United Nations.....	1,208
Republic of Korea.....	6,979
Total.....	11,014

The Armistice Agreement provides for the formulation of Joint Red Cross Teams whose function during the repatriation is to provide "such humanitarian services as are necessary and desirable for the welfare of the prisoners of war." Early in the repatriation it became apparent that those Communist members of the Joint Red Cross Teams had missions not in consonance with the Armistice Agreement. The Communists signed an operating agreement with their United Nations Command Red Cross counterparts and then proceeded to complain at every turn against implementation of its several provisions. In practically every instance their complaints and formal "reports" were pure propaganda. As a result of these Communist tactics, any real service which might have been rendered the prisoners in United Nations Command custody was prevented. Also, meager reports from teams operating in North Korea left no doubt that those Joint Red Cross Team members were seeing only what the Communists wanted them to see and were performing their "humanitarian services" only insofar as Communist policy permitted.

In spite of all the unnecessary handicaps the United Nations Command proceeded in good faith with the implementation of the Armistice Agreement.

United Nations Command Ground Forces continued to re-establish themselves in new defensive positions south of the Demilitarized Zone. Intensive training activities were engaged in by all units, designed to maintain a high state of morale and combat readiness. United Nations Forces continued to support, logistically and otherwise, the various agencies created under the terms of the Armistice Agreement. Aid and assistance was also provided

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted on Mar. 11 to the Secretary-General, for circulation to members of the Security Council, by the acting U. S. representative to the U.N. Text of the 50th report appears in the BULLETIN of Dec. 15, 1952, p. 958; the 51st and 52d reports, Dec. 29, 1952, p. 1034; the 53d report, Jan. 26, 1953, p. 155; the 54th report, Feb. 9, 1953, p. 224; the 55th report, Feb. 16, 1953, p. 276; the 56th report, Mar. 2, 1953, p. 348; excerpts from the 57th, 58th, and 59th reports, May 11, 1953, p. 690; excerpts from the 61st, 64th, and 65th reports, July 13, 1953, p. 50; excerpts from the 67th, 68th, and 69th reports, Sept. 28, 1953, p. 423; excerpts from the 70th, 71st, 72d, and 73d reports, Jan. 4, 1954, p. 30; the 74th report, Jan. 11, 1954, p. 61; and the 75th report, Jan. 18, 1954, p. 92.



for the civilian populace by United Nations Command military forces.

Pursuant to the Armistice Agreement, the United Nations Naval Forces were directed to cease hostilities and blockade operations; to perform certain initial tasks; to maintain an alert state of readiness, and to comply with the letter of the Armistice Agreement.

The largest task in connection with the Armistice Agreement conducted during this period has been the transporting of prisoners of war from United Nations prisoners of war stockades to Inchon.

As of 31 August 61,415 Chinese Communist and North Korean military prisoners of war and civilian internees had been delivered to the exchange site. It is presently planned to complete embarkation of all repatriates on 3 September. The debarkation of these repatriates will take place on 5 September.

There have been no serious incidents reported during this period. Mutually planned and agreed on daily quotas have been met with only minor problems. Typhoon "NINA" delayed operations of 16, 17 and 18th. However, lifts began again on the 19th and normal operations resumed. It is tentatively planned to commence the final phase of operation "BIG SWITCH" on 8 September. In accordance with these plans the lift of Chinese Communist non-repatriate prisoners of war from Mosulpo to Inchon will commence on that date. Two thousand will be lifted daily for seven consecutive days, then approximately two hundred seventy on the eighth day. The lift of North Korean non-repatriate prisoners of war from Koje-do to Pusan will commence on or about 9 September with five hundred being lifted the first day and one hundred fifty the following day.

United Nations Naval aircraft continued to conduct intensive training exercises while maintaining an alert state of readiness.

On 27 September 1952 Commander in Chief, United Nations Command established a Sea Defense Zone for the purpose of preventing attacks on the Korean coast; securing the United Nations Command sea lines of communication and preventing the introduction of contraband or entry of enemy agents into Republic of Korea territory. This zone which extends around the perimeter of Korea has remained a United Nations Naval responsibility since it was established. In order to observe both the letter and the spirit of the Armistice Agreement Commander in Chief, United Nations Command suspended this zone on 25 August with the reservation that it may be reinstated at any future date depending on the military situation.

The Military Sea Transportation Service and merchant vessels under contract provided personnel lifts and logistics as required for the United Nations Naval, Air and Ground Forces.

United Nations Command Air Force units which were committed to the Korean War continued to expand their training operations as the first month of the Armistice passed without major incident. These training flights are designed to maintain the pilots and crews at a high degree of combat readiness in the event hostilities should be resumed.

Air Sea Rescue units were constantly alerted to perform search and rescue missions for missing aircraft, shipping and personnel.

United States Senator William F. Knowland, United States Ambassador to the Republic of Korea Ellis O. Briggs, United Nations Command Economic Co-ordination C. Tyler Wood, President of the Republic of Korea Syngman Rhee and Prime Minister Too Chin Paik participated in the ceremonies held in Pusan, Korea, on 29 August 1953, marking the arrival of the SS *New Rochelle Victory* with the first grain shipment under the newly authorized \$200 million United States appropriation for the Korean Reconstruction Rehabilitation and Defense Support Program. Some 2,000 Korean, United States, and United Nations officials attended the ceremonies. Czech and Polish members of the Pusan Team of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission were also present.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Germany—Relations

Convention on relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, with annexes.<sup>1</sup> Signed at Bonn May 26, 1952 by the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and the Federal Republic. *Ratification deposited:* Germany—March 30, 1954.

Convention on the tax treatment of the Forces and their members.<sup>1</sup> Signed at Bonn May 26, 1952 by the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and the Federal Republic.

*Ratification deposited:* Germany—March 30, 1954.

#### Weather Stations

Agreement on North Atlantic Ocean Stations. Dated at Paris February 25, 1954. Enters into force (not earlier than July 1, 1954) when instruments of acceptance have been deposited by Governments responsible for the operation of not less than fifteen of the vessels referred to in Article I.

*Signatures:*  
United States<sup>\*</sup>  
Belgium  
Canada  
Denmark  
France  
Ireland

Israel  
Italy  
Netherlands  
Norway  
Sweden  
Switzerland  
United Kingdom

#### BILATERAL

##### United Kingdom

Agreement relating to a technical assistance program in erosion control and soil conservation in the Caribbean area pursuant to the general agreement for technical cooperation for territories for which the United Kingdom is responsible of July 13, 1951 (TIAS 2281). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington January 12 and 20, 1954. Entered into force January 20, 1954.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

<sup>2</sup> Subject to availability of funds and facilities.

## New Foreign Relations Volume Released

Press release 174 dated April 2

The Department of State is releasing on April 10 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1936, Volume I, General, The British Commonwealth*. Of outstanding historical interest in this volume are the documents on two steps along the road to World War II: the breakdown in efforts for military and naval disarmament and Hitler's dramatic move of sending his troops into the Rhineland.

The Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments was already in abeyance before 1936 and the papers in the present volume record the fruitless efforts to renew work on disarmament. Documentation on the London Naval Conference tells of efforts to meet the situation created by the withdrawal of Japan from the Conference following the rejection of a common upper limit in naval strength. A limited treaty was signed on March 25, 1936, between the United States, members of the British Commonwealth, and France. While this treaty did not provide for quantitative limitation, letters were exchanged on the same day between the head of the American delegation, Norman Davis, and the British Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden, recording an understanding that the principle of naval parity between the United States and the British Commonwealth should remain unchanged and that there should be no competitive building between the two powers (p. 99).

The march of Hitler's troops into the Rhineland on March 7, 1936, and its potential effects form the chief subject of the papers printed under the title "Analyses and reports by American diplomatic missions regarding European political developments affecting the preservation of peace" (pp. 180-389). American diplomats rightly assessed this move as a potential step in preparation for a program of aggression. At that time, however, events in Europe were more a matter of concern to the United States than an occasion for action. The plea of French Foreign Minister Flandin for a statement by the President or Secretary of State condemning on moral grounds the repudiation of a treaty was turned down (pp. 217, 228). To a message from Ambassador Josephus Daniels in Mexico urging the President to tender good offices, the reply was an expression of hope that no drastic action would be necessary (pp. 219, 237). When the League of Nations Council met in London to consider the crisis, the American Chargé was instructed not to attend as a visitor (p. 244). The position of the United States was explained by Under Secretary of State William Phillips to

the Turkish Ambassador in the words "we could not become involved in purely European politics" (p. 245).

Ambassador William E. Dodd at Berlin was inclined to blame the isolationism of the United States for the progress of aggression. In a telegram beginning "Please show the President" he connected Hitler's action with the failure to stop aggression against Ethiopia, including "the Hoare-Laval performance and the news that the United States washed its hands for good and have nothing at all to do with Europe" (pp. 249-250).

In December Ambassador William C. Bullitt reported from Paris that he had been consulted by the German Ambassador, Count von Welczeck, on the prospects of reaching a full understanding with France but apparently nothing came of the move (pp. 380-381, 382).

Aside from problems of armament and threats to peace, the multilateral subjects treated in the General section of this volume include negotiations for the suppression of liquor smuggling into the United States and on a number of economic problems. The section on the British Commonwealth deals entirely with commercial matters, especially with the efforts of Secretary of State Hull to secure the cooperation of the British Government in his international trade program.

*Volume I, General, The British Commonwealth* is the second to be issued in the series of five *Foreign Relations* volumes for the year 1936, *Volume III, The Near East and Africa* having been previously published. The remaining three volumes will be released within the next few weeks. Volume I was compiled in the Historical Division by George Verne Blue, a former staff member, and Matilda F. Axton and Shirley L. Phillips under the direction of E. R. Perkins, Editor of *Foreign Relations*. Technical editing was in charge of Elizabeth A. Vary, Chief of the Foreign Relations Editing Branch of the Division of Publications. Copies of this volume (LXXV, pp. 892) may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. for \$4.25 each.

### FOREIGN SERVICE

#### Consular Office

The consular agency at Puerto Cortes, Honduras, was officially closed on March 1, 1954. All functions formerly performed by this office will now be handled by the American consulate at San Pedro Sula, Honduras.



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### Check List of Department of State Press Releases: April 12-18

Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C. Press releases issued prior to April 12 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 174 of April 2, 184 of April 8, and 185 and 186 of April 9.

No.	Date	Subject
191	4/12	Georgescu boys' release
192	4/13	Joint Dulles-Eden statement
193	4/13	Mates credentials (rewrite)
194	4/13	Farley, Suomela appointments (rewrite)
†195	4/13	Holland: Pan American Day
†196	4/13	Holland: Archeological exhibits
197	4/14	Joint Dulles-Bidault statement
*198	4/14	Educator to lecture in Germany
†199	4/16	Tax conventions with Japan
†200	4/16	Protection of cultural property
†201	4/16	Foreign Relations volume
202	4/17	Military assistance negotiations with Nicaragua

\*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

***Foreign Relations of the United States . . .***

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**1936, Volume IV, The Far East**



the  
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State

This volume is divided into three main sections: The Far Eastern Crisis, China, Japan. There is also a short section on Siam (Thailand).

Reports on conditions in the Far East which form a background for the later outbreak of war comprise the major portion of this volume. Direct negotiations between the United States and Far Eastern governments in 1936 were of relatively minor importance save for those connected with Japan's withdrawal from the London Naval Conference (recorded in *Foreign Relations, 1936, Volume I, General, The British Commonwealth and Foreign Relations, Japan 1931-1941, Volume I*).

While 1936 was a period of relative inactivity in Japan's extension of power in China, evaluations of the situation by American diplomats showed that they were not lulled into any delusion that Japanese aggressive aims were ended.

Two dramatic incidents of especial significance, one in Japan and one in China, are reported on at length in this volume. The first was the outbreak by an army group who on February 26 assassinated a number of high Japanese officials. The second was the detention by force of Chiang Kai-shek at Sian, December 12-25, to bring pressure upon him for leading united Chinese resistance to Japan.

Copies of this volume may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. for \$4.50 each.

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